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AN UNCERTAIN PRIVILEGE: IMPLIED WAIVER AND
THE EVISCERATION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST
PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Deirdre M. Smith*

An uncertai n privilege , or one which purports to be certain but re
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at aiJ.l
I NTROD UCTIO N

The psychotherapist-patient privilege is, in many respects, in its nas
cent years in t he federal courts, having been first recogn ized by the
U nited States Supreme Court only twelve years ago in Jaffee v. R ed
mond.2 In holding t hat federal courts mus t pro tect confidential com
munications arising in psychotherapy notwithsta nding the "likely
evide ntiary benefit" of such communica tions, t he Supreme Court
reasoned:
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilita t
ing the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering
the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental health of
our citizenry , no less than its physical health , is a public good of
transcenden t importa nce.3
Psychotherapy is t he context in which, perhaps more tha n in any
o ther, a person is most likely to reveal unflattering inform ation abou t
herself, as well as her fears , vu lnerabilities , guilt, disappointme nts,
d oubts, and anxieties. By recognizing t he p rivilege in broad terms, the
Court appeared to create a wall of protection against disclosure of
such statements in litigation, including responses to discovery re
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., University of Penn
sylvania, 1988; J .D., University of Maine School of Law, 1994. I am grateful to the following
people who read earlier drafts of this article and provided many helpful insights: Colin Miller,
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Deborah Tuerkheimer, and Jennifer Wriggins. I am appreciative of
Dean Peter Pitegoff for providing generous summer research support, and of the staff of the
Donald L. Garbrecht Law Library for its research assistance.
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)).
2. See i.d.
3. Jd. at 11.
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quests ,4 marking the first time tha t the Court had recognized the over
riding significa nce of mental health trea tment.
Now that Jaffee is in its second decade, we can begin to take stock
of its vitality and impact. In the short time since Jaffee , the federal
courts have created a body of law in disarray, with inconsistent ap
proaches to e nforcement of the privilege found even within the same
districts The source of the chaos is the courts' contradictory treat
ment of the question of when a civil litigant is deemed to have waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental condition
in issue through the assertion of a particular claim or defense. The
issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege can arise in
any case in which a plaintiff who has received mental health treatme nt
at some point in her life seeks emotional distress damages. The fed
eral case law on this question, however, has developed almost exclu
sively in the context of civil rights cases.6 Since the federal court
system is a primary forum for the vindication of civil rights claims,
such as those alleging discrimination or excessive force, the federal
courts' approaches to the psychothe rapist-patient privilege and their
conceptualization of waiver of the privilege can have a crucial impact
on the course of civil rights litigation and on whether litigation even
occurs? Properly framed, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can
serve as a critical tool to ensure that those with mental illness may
enforce their rights unde r federal law without concern that their
mental health histories will become a central issue in the litigation.
Conversely, waiver formulations can chill federal civil rights litigation,
4. I d. Under the Federal RuJes of Evidence, the rules with respect to privileges apply not only
to the admissibility of evidence at trial but to " all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings. "
FED. R. Evro. 1101(c).
5. Lynne Bernabei & Andrew Schroeder, Protect Clients ' Private Health Records, T RIAL, Sept.
2004, at 32, 33 (noting that it is difficuJt for a plaintiff's counsel to predict " which theory of
waiver [of the psychotherapist-patient privilege] a court will adopt" due to the Jack of uniformity
within jurisdictions) . Compare Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625,
at *11 (S.D .N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006) (rejecting argument that plaintiff waived psychotherapist-patient
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages), with Manessis v. New York City Dep't of
Transp., No. 02-CIV359, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) (reaching the oppo
site conclusion on the same question) .
6. Of the dozens of federal cases considering implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege cited herein and otherwise identified during the course of my research, only three arose
outside the civil rights context. See Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL
3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (insurance coverage); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic
Assocs., II, P.C., 2004 WL 1813232 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2004) (medical malpractice); Adams v.
Ardcor, 196 F.R. D. 339 (E.D. Wise. 2000) (industrial accident).
7. Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 32 (assuming that plaintiffs likely do not choose in
which forum to litigate a discrimination case, where given a choice, based upon the level of
protection provided to confidential medical records, but noting that the choice of forum can
dictate the degree to which medical records much be disclosed) .
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virtually ensuring that some plaintiffs' civil rights will never be
vindicated.
Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of recog
nizing and enforcing a psychotherapy patient 's right to maintain the
confidentiality of he r communications, lowe r courts have eroded the
privilege beyond recognition through the notion of implied waiver.
While the case law is entirely unsettled, one fact has clearly e merged:
by filing suit in fede ral court seeking any form of compensation fo r
psychic injury, a plaintiff runs a substantial risk that he r current and
past me ntal health treatment will become a focus of discovery and
perhaps of the defense theory at trial. With a significant number of
individuals in the United States seeking mental he alth treatment,8 and
with recent e nhance ment of remedies available under fede ral civil
rights laws,9 courts' expansive views of waiver have resulted in a colli
sion between plaintiffs' efforts to vindicate their civil rights in fede ral
court and defendants' ability to exploit the issues that arise in plain
tiffs' mental health tre atment to gain an advantage in litigation. How
ever, in developing the waiver doctrine , courts utte rly fail to weigh the
potential impact on future plaintiffs' decisions whether to pursue civil
rights claims at all.
Prior scholarship on the development of the psychotherapist-patie nt
privilege in fede ral courts has note d the sharp division in the courts on
the issue of waiver. 10 This schola rship, however, has neither consid
ered the broader impact of such uncertainty on the role of fede ral
courts in protecting civil rights nor advanced an alternative configura
tion of waiver to be adopted in this context. This Article analyzes the
questions implicate d by waiver of the psychotherapist-patie nt privi
lege and proposes a reasoned and cohe rent approach to resolving
waiver disputes to ensure that the concept of waiver does not vitiate
8. Studies conducted in 1993 and 1996 estimated that approximately eleven percent of adults
in t he United States received professional mental health treatment each year. R onald C Kessler
et a!., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 36 HEALTH SERVICES
REs. 987 (2001 ); Darrel A . Regier eta!., The De Facto US Mental and Addictive Disorders Ser
vice System. Epidemiologic Calchment A rea Prospective 1-Year Prevalence Rales of Disorders
and Services , 50 ARCH IVES G EN. PsYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 85. The United States Surgeon
General cited both articles in Menlal Health: A R eport of the Surgeon General (1999), at ch. 2,
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ mentalhealth/chapter2/sec7.html.
9. See infra notes 25- 28 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health Provider Privilege in the Wake of Jaffee v.
Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 591 (2001); Ryan M. G ott, Note, The Evolving Treatment of " Gar
den-Variety" Claims Under the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 SuFFOLK J. T RIAL & APP.
Aovoc . 91 (2001); Ellen E . McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow
Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369
(2001) .
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t he privilege entirely and t herefore undermine the importa nt purposes
it serves.
Part II of t his Article examines the role of mental health evidence
during discovery in civil litiga tion, pa rticularly in federal civil rights
cases , the context in which the issues of the psychotherapist-patie nt
privilege and waiver issues generally arise. 11 Part III then traces the
origins of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege to the Supreme
Court's Jaffee opinion and reviews the various assumptions and ratio
nales that shaped the debate regarding the development of the privi
lege in t he state legislatu res and eventually in the federal courts. 1 2
Part IV reviews and critiques the post-Jaffee case law rega rding im
plied waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege.B The courts' in
consistent approaches stem from t he significa nt variation in their
conceptualizations of the privilege and of waiver, as well as t he under
lying rationales of each. Federal courts too often fail to apply the
broade r principles implicated by questions of whether one has waived
a legally protected right. Mos t significa ntly, courts do not predicate a
finding of waiver on whether the holde r of that right took some af
firma tive step that can be properly characterized as waiving t he right.
Instead, under the guise of implied waiver, many courts analyze the
controversy employing conside rations of privacy and fairness devel
oped unde r the rules governing discovery procedure. O t hers allow
conceptions of releva nce and evidentiary value-expressly disallowed
by Jaffe- to creep into or do minate t he analysis of waiver questions.
Such considera tions, however, have no place in a determination of
waiver.
In Part V, the Article proposes a new fra mework for analyzing is
sues of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, especially in
t he discovery contextY It firs t offers an alternative conceptualization
of the underlying rationale of t he privilege. Specifically, the privilege
encourages individuals to seek remedies fo r violations of t heir civil
rights who might otherwise be discouraged from doing so out of fea r
t hat t heir mental health treatment history will become a central issue
in the litiga tion. Part V then adva nces a new approach tha t is consis
tent with both the Supreme Court's formulation of the privilege in
Jaffee and with the broade r principles applicable to questions of
waiver.15 Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court must provide
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

17-44 and accompanying text.
45- 132 and accompanying text.
133- 324 and accompanying text.
325- 349 and accompanying text.
350-394 and accompanying text.
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guidance to lower courts on the issue of waiver of the psychotherapist
patient privilege in order to preserve me aningful access to the federal
courts for all individuals, regardless of their history of me ntal health
treatment. 16

II.

DISCOVERY OF MENTAL H EALTH R E CORDS
IN CiviL L ITIGATION

The operation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is at issue
most often and most contentiously when a defendant in a civil action
involving claims for e motional distress damages seeks records, testi
mony, and other information regarding a plaintiff's current and past
mental health treatmentP U nrestricted access to a plaintiff's mental
health records, particularly notes and records from psychotherapy ses
sions and diagnostic evaluations, can yield some of the most valuable
discovery to a defendant. Such records may provide the most direct
and uninfluenced view of the plaintiff, her life, her opinions, her per
sonality, and her vulne rabilities.18 Mental health records may contain
admissions about the incident at issue in the litigation, or even the
plaintiff's impressions of the litigation itself. Alternatively, mental
health records may place the incident at issue in the litigation in con
text by revealing othe r circumstances in the plaintiff's life, such as
marital problems and struggles with childhood trauma. 19
By contrast, other forms of discovery generally yield less useful in
formation. Non-psychotherapy medical records tend to reveal little ,
as physicians typically do not record- or later recollect- a patient's
statements during a fifteen-minute office visit. Plaintiffs' lawyers draft
interrogatory answers with the object of disclosing as little as possible.
Depositions occur once litigation is underway, after extensive prepa
ration sessions with counsel, and when a litigant is quite guarded
about making revelations in response to questions from opposing
counsel. Psychotherapy records, however, contain few siinilar mediat
16. See infra notes 395-400 and accompanying text.
17. See Michael L. Orenstein, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 20 Tou Ro L. REv. 679,
679 (2004) (noting that the issue of privilege generally arises when a defendant is seeking a
plaintiff's mental health records) .
18. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("The psychiatric patient
confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what
his words dir ectly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his
shame." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MANFRED S. GurrMACHER & HENRY
WEtHOFEN, PsYCHIATRY AND T HE LAw 272 (1952))) .
19. Albert M. Drukteinis notes that a " critical factor" in determining causation in " mental
damage" claims is " longitudinal life history. " Albert M. Drukteinis, Understanding and EvaltuU
ing Mental Damages, PsYCHIATRIC T IMES, Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://www.psychiatric
times.com/display/article/10168155241.
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ing influences. The informa tion is as close to a peek into a litigant's
mind as one can presently achieve through discovery. 20 Thus, defend
ants' attorneys are highly motivated to develop crea tive arguments to
gain access to such records, and plaintiffs ' attorneys are at leas t as
equally motivated to resist such arguments.
The most commonly offered rationale by civil defendants in support
of their discovery requests for psychotherapy records is a plaintiff's
claim for emotional distress damages.21 In the 1990s, a confluence of
factors tra nsformed the landscape of e motional distress damages in
federal civil rights actions, which themselves comprise a substa ntial
proportion of civil matters in which plaintiffs seek recovery for per
sonal injuries. 22 Prior to that time, the primary vehicles for collecting
emotional distress damages in federal courts were either tort actions
based upon diversity of the pa rties, or civil rights actions brought pur
suant to § 1983,23 through which plaintiffs could receive most sta te
law tort remedies.24 In 1990, Congress e nacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which greatly expanded the reach of the anti
discrimination provisions of the Re habilita tion Act to include a signif
icant number of public and private e ntities and e mployers.25 A yea r
later, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,26 which extended
the right to seek compensa tory damages, including damages for emo
20. Access to treatment notes covering treatment prior to the litigation, or even the incident
at issue, can be particularly valuable since it avoids the common "contaminating factors" that
can be present in forensic psychological examinations. Jd.
21. See, e.g. , Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 133 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
22 . In 2007, civil rights complaints comprised twelve percent of all civil case filings in the
federal courts, a figure slightly lower than the number of personal injury and product liability
filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CoURT, FEDERAL CoURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/crnsd2007.pl (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) . The remaining catego
ries of civil filings (e.g. social security, prisoner filings , forfeitures , contracts, intellectual property
matters) do not generally involve recovery for personal injuries.
23. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000).
24. DAN B. DoBBs, THE LAw oF T oRTS 82 (2000) ("Section 1983 authorizes tort claims for
deprivation of federal rights under color of state Jaw.").
25. Americans with D isabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008);
see also Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U .S.C.
§ 1981A (2000)); see§ 1981A(b)(3) (listing damages available to victims of intentional discrimi
nation as including compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffer
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, Joss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses").
The award of damages is subject to caps, based upon the size of the employer. § 1981A(b)(3).
In recent years, an increasing number of clinical studies have documented the potential psycho
logical impact of discrimination. See generally SHARYN A NN LENHART, CLINICAL AsPECTS oF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: PsYCHOLOGICAL CoNSEQUENCES AND
T REATMENT INTERVENTIONS (2004); Melba J .T. Vasquez et al., Assessing Employment Discrimi
nation and Harassment, in 2 HANDBOOK oF PsYCHOLOGY: FoRENSIC PsYCHOLOGY 259- 74
(Alan Goldstein ed., 2003) .
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tional distress , to employment discrimination plaintiffs pursu ing
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 a nd the
A D A.28
As a result of these two statutes , mental health issues quickly be
came predominant in employment discrimination cases.29 Whereas
p reviously employers ' attorneys argued t ha t access to a plaintiff's
mental health records was necessary to defend on the issu e of liabil
ity,30 the availability of emotional distress d amages and the expansion
of discrimina tion claims based upon mental illness e nhanced the rele
vancy arguments rega rding access to these records. 31 The same yea r
of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pu blic awareness of
sexual harassment brou ght about by t he confirmation hearings of
Clarence Thomas may have led to a multifold increase in sexual har
assment claims.32 These trends were well u nderway when the Su 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-3 (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008) .
29. James J. McDonald, J r. & Francine B. Kulick, Preface to MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJU
RIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION xxxvi - xxxvii (James J. McDonald, J r. & Francine B. Kulick
eds., 2001) [hereinafter MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES].
30. See, e.g. , i.d. at 219 (explaining that an employee's pre-existing " personality disorder" may
" produce cognitive distortions and unreasonable expectations and demands that may impact
liability issues in an employment lawsuit"); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118
F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Aa. 1988) (denying discovery of sexual harassment plaintiffs ment al
health treatment where defendant sought to establish plaintiffs " hypersensitivity to
pornography").
31. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employment discrimination plain
tiffs frequently included separate tort claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a means to seek compensatory damages for emotional distress. See, e.g. , Green v.
Am. Broad. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D.D.C. 1986). However, plaintiffs must prove each of
the elements of those torts in order to recover emotional distress damages and such efforts are
not always successful . /d. at 1362~ (granting summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Also, some courts have held that such tort
claims aJe pre-empted by state workers' compensation statutes. See generally Jarod S. Gonzales,
State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the
Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REv. 115 (2007).
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filings reflected a more than twofold in
crease in sexual haJassment cases over a five -yeaJ period, from 6127 in 1991 to 15,342 in 1996.
Jennifer Steinhauer, If the Boss is Out of Line, What's the Legal Boundary? Testing a Wider
Concept of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at DL See also Noelle C. Brennan,
Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: The Hostile Environment of a Courtroom ,
44 DEPAUL L. REv. 545, 545 n.3 (1995) ("In the three months following the Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported a
70% increase in reports of sexual haJassment, as compared to the previous year. "); Allen R.
Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up the Fight, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1
(reviewing possible causes of increase in employment discrimination filings and noting that
" [e]xperts attribute the growth in sexual-haJassment cases to Anita Hill's confrontation of Judge
ClaJence Thomas at his Supreme Court confirmation hearings"). However, it is not apparent to
what extent the increase in filings is attributable to the Hill-Thomas controversy or the expan
sion of available remedies. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily:
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preme Court first recognized t he psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Jaffee in 1996.

A claim for emotional distress damages raises issues of causation,
severity, and sincerity, including whether a plaintiff is accurately stat
ing t he source o r extent of her emotional distress. 33 Mental health
records may offer tools for defendants seeking to limit damages by
challenging the claim on any of those aforementioned issues.34 Estab
lishing causa tion for emotional distress damages is not a straightfor
ward task. Given the complexity of t he human psyche, a defendant
can argue that anything in a plaintiff's life contributed to her emo
tional or mental condition.35 Psychotherapy treatment notes may re
veal " prior or concurrent alternative stressors, such as childhood
sexual abuse or marital discord," any of which could arguably be a
contributing or alternative cause of e motional distress.36 Thus, de
fe ndants have easily fashioned and found support for superficially
valid arguments for a need to obtain a wide ra nge of mental health
New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. PosT, May 12, 1997, at A 1 ("Employment
discrimination cases are surging into the federal courts in record numbers, more than doubling in
the past four years because of new laws and new attitudes in the workplace.»).
33. Drukteinis, supra note 19.
34. David A. Cathcart, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress, and Puni
tive Damages In Employment Cases, C108 ALI-ABA 547 (1995). Mr. Cathcart explained:
Employers should explore in discovery alternative causes for the plaintiff's alleged
emotional distress. Employers should consult with psychiatric or psychological experts
as necessary or appropriate to develop discovery on injuries and to perform examina
tion of the plaintiffs ment al state. Such matters might include recent divorce, bank
ruptcy, surgery, accidents, or other traumatic personal events. All prior psychiatric
records of the plaintiff should be requested.
/d. ; see John H. Mason & Christopher L. Ekman, Defending Against Damages Claims In Dis
crimination Cases, 13 LAB. LAw. 471, 495 (1998) ("[I]n order to defend against a claim of emo
tional distress in a discrimination case, the defendant employer should seek to establish, through
discovery of the plaintiff's medical or psychiatric records or otherwise, possible pre-existing or
alternate sources of the plaintiffs alleged emotional distress."); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Sexual
Harassment Cases in the Courts, or Therapy Goes to War: Supporting a Sexual Harassment Vic
tim During Litigation, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WoRKPLACE AND ACADEMIA: PsYCHI
ATRIC IssuEs 133, 142 (Diane K. Shrier ed., 1996) (" In the effort to minimize [emotional
distress] damages, the defendant's attorney will leave no stone untumed. This is where the dis
covery process becomes nastiest.").
35. Similarly, defendants have successfully sought and obtained marital counseling records in
loss of consortium claims. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 622-23 (S.D.
Cal. 1996) (recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege pre-Jaffee, but also finding waiver
based solely upon plaintiffs' claim for loss of consortium as part of an excessive force , wrongful
death claim) .
36. James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preparing the Case for the Expert, in
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES, supra note 29, at 262, 272. The authors of this defense
oriented book suggest several questions to be asked of a discrimination plaintiff for the purpose
of eliciting information about the plaintiffs mental health. /d. at 279-82.
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evide nce.37 Defendants who plan to use me ntal health professionals
as either testifying or consulting experts are particularly motivated to
access as much information as possible about a plaintiff's mental
health history and present condition.38
At the same time, a plaintiff may be horrified to learn that her psy
chotherapy history will be made available, not only to the opposing
counsel, but also to the opposing party (perhaps an e mployer who
subjected her to sexual harassment), the court, the jury, and the gen

37. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("'t is not difficult to consider the many
ways in which it would be argued that the mental conditions of claimants are at issue. "); David
A . Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintiffs Mental Health History in an Employment Discrimina 
tion Case, 16 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 55, 59 (1994); see also Zachary D. Fasman, Taking the
Plaintiffs Deposition: The Defense Viewpoint, 712 PLI/Lrr 513 (Nov. 2004) . The author advises
defense attorneys to cover the following in a deposition of a plaintiff in an employment discrimi
nation claim:
(40) Where the plaintiff is claiming emotional distress damages, obtain as much infor
mation as possible about the symptoms which plaintiff claims support emotional dis 
tress: when they began; how severe they were; how they interfered with his/her normal
activities; whether they still do, if not, when they ceased to do so; whether they were
similar in kind or character to anything plaintiff had experienced previously or since.
(41) When plaintiff initially sought treatment for such ailments, and if the treatment
was not sought immediately why not.
(42) Whether plaintiff was suffering from any other problems at or about the time the
symptoms began, and if so what those events were like in comparison to the trauma
suffered at the hands of the employer.
Fasman, supra, at 535. The author further advises defense attorneys to " [i)nquire about the
existence of alternative stressors (e.g. , a death in the family, marital and family problems, finan 
cial problems, medical problems) contemporaneous with the alleged stressful events in plaintiffs
workplace" and to "[i)nquire about pre-existing mental disorders and symptoms of emotional
distress. This is a crucial area ." 1d. at 539, 541 (emphasis added). As a follow-up to the deposi
tion, the author continues, " if plaintiff has claimed emotional distress damage and has identified
medical practitioners, depose them promptly. " 1d. at 537. If the therapist took " notes during the
sessions ... subpoena the writings." 1d. at 543. But see infra notes 256-284 and accompanying
text, questioning whether the "alternative sources of emotional distress" basis for discovery of
psychotherapy records is consistent with basic notions of the law of tort damages.
38. See, e.g. , McDonald & Kulick, supra note 36, at 271 (emphasizing that defense counsel
should obtain and provide to an examining psychiatric expert all mental health records, deposi
tion transcripts, and similar items in advance of the expert's meeting with the plaintiff) . Another
tool frequently used by defense counsel, particularly in sexual harassment cases, is a compelled
mental health examination pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al
though this Article provides a brief analysis of the core issues in Rule 35 disputes, infra at notes
285- 310 and accompanying text, comprehensive treatment of the scope and application of the
rule is found elsewhere. See, e.g. , Richard A. Bales & Priscilla Ray, The Availability of Rule 35
Mental Examinations in Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 REv. LITIG. 1 (1997); Kent D.
Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: Reexamining
Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 1268 (1995).

88

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:79

eral public.39 The controversies over the psychotherapist-patient priv
ilege and the discovery of mental health records generally arise in
those cases where a plaintiff chooses not to offer some or all of her
mental health treatment records in support of her claims and resists a
defendant's efforts to obtain such records through discovery. In many
insta nces in which a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages, a
plaintiff who has received psychotherapy trea tment fo r such emo
tional distress will list one or more trea ting therapists as expert wit
nesses and plan to introduce some or part of her trea tment records as
evide nce of her e motional distress. 40 In o ther cases, however, a plain
tiff may plan to offer only her own testimony as to the psychological
impact of the defenda nt 's actions. She may have received mental
health treatment fo r such distress but could choose not to offer the
testimony of her treating therapist. The plaintiff also may have been
in treatment at the time of, or prior to, the incident at the center of the
litigation, and she may attempt to keep all records of such treatment
out of the ha nds of the defendant's attorney.
Where a plaintiff produces her psychotherapy records in discovery,
she may be asked at her deposition about certain statements she made
in t reatment, perhaps with a copy of her t herapist's notes in front of
the deposing attorney. Some of the specific content of the psycho
therapy records may have relatively low value to the defense attorney
in terms of proof of the central issues in contention in the case , such as
liability or the extent of emotional distress damages, but the defense
attorney may use the records to paint a negative picture of the plain
tiff o r to cause emba rrassment, thereby improving settlement chances.
For example, notes of psychotherapy sessions afte r the plaintiff initi
ates litiga tion may include references to t he plaintiff's feelings about

39. See Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing plaintiffs' feelings of "violation "
at having to disclose medical records, especially mental health records, in employment discrimi
nation cases).
40. Rodney J . S. Deaton eta!., The Role of the Mental Health Professional in Employment
Litigat ion , in MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJ URIES, supra note 29, at 50, 58. Indeed, in some
instances, a plaintiffs attorney may refer her to a therapist for evaluation and treatment so as to
ensure that the emotional distress is documented and can be proven through a witness other
than the plaintiff herself. See generally JoN R. ABELE, EMOTIONAL DisTREss: PROVING DAM
AGES 103-08 (2003) (discussing benefits of offering expert medical testimony in support of
claims for emotional distress) .
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the litigation itsel£.4 1 In short, disclosure of such records is of high
value to defenda nts and correspondingly high cost to plaintiffs. 42
Given the significant value and cost associated with the disclosure
of records from psychotherapeutic treatment in civil litiga tion, it is not
surprising that, as psychotherapy became more widespread and the
availability of emotional distress damages expanded in fede ral courts,
t he controversies over the role of such records in civil litigation be
came increasingly common. As discussed in the next section, due
largely to the efforts of psychotherapists and psychiatrists to receive
protection for their professional communications, state legislatures
and later t he federal courts fashio ned a new privilege to limit the dis
41. For example, in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw , 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007), the
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to preclude the introduction into evidence at trial on her Fam
ily and Medical Leave Act claim certain statements she had made to her therapist to the effect
that she was " unhappy with her attorney who told her he didn't want to be used as a tool for her
revenge. " Jd. at 820. The defendant's attorney argued in response to the plaintiff's objection:
"She's depressed, it makes reference to her mood, and we're entitled to explore and argue any
thing that would have [an) impact on her mood." Jd. at 820-21. The appeals court affirmed the
trial court's admission of the record on the basis that she had waived her psychotherapist-patient
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages. Jd. at 821. The court concluded that the trial
court's admissibility analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 was "reasonable." Id.; see also
Murray v. Bd. of Educ. , 199 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring plaintiff in an employ
ment discrimination case to disclose those portions of her psychotherapist's notes that revealed
references to and communications with her attorney in that case).
42. In addition to these factors, other consequences may flow from the release of psychother
apy records in litigation. There is a real risk, which likely cannot be quantified or proven, that a
fact finder would use such evidence impermissibly at trial to judge a plaintiffs character, credi
bility, or likeability. There is little question that stigma, discrimination, and prejudice against
people with mental illness continue to pervade American society. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, T HE
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY o N TRIAL 21- 24, 39-43 (2000) (describing the nature
and pervasiveness of sanism); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITlES ACT 5 (2001)
("Social science research confirms that ment al illness is one of the most- if not the most
stigmatized of social conditions."); Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental
Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA , 94 GEo. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) ("Social discrimination against
people with mental illness is widespread.") . What is far from certain, however, is what impact
these factors may have on juror decision making. See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BoRNSTEIN,
DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PsYCHOLOGY oF J u RY AwARDS 52 (2003). The authors note:
Data are especially paltry on the effects of plaintiff characteristics on noneconomic
damages (related to intangibles such as the plaintiffs physical and mental distress, pain
and suffering, loss of consortium, etc.) despite the fact that there are significant hori
zontal inequities in compensation for these losses . . . . [N)o studies have examined how
jurors perceive the amount of pain and suffering experienced by different kinds of
plaintiffs and how they translate those perceptions into a judgment about
compensation.
Id.; see Edith Greene et al., Juror Decisions about Damages in Employ ment Discrimination
Cases, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 107, 108 (1999) ("Whether juries are competent to make reasonable
assessments of claims for lost wages and pain and suffering in age and other discrimination cases
is unknown.").
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closure of such records.43 However, as discussed in Part IV , this tool
is of limited effect as federal courts apply a broad conceptualization of
waiver to the privilege, which e nables defendants ' attorneys to gain
access to such records in most cases in which the records are sought.44
III.

THE EvoLUTION OF THE P sYCHOTHERAPIST
pATIE NT PRIVILEGE

The controversies that surround the psychothe rapist-patient privi
lege and its application to civil litigation in federal courts trace their
origins to the development of the privilege itself. The contempora ry
case law addressing questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege reflects the long-standing resistance to the expansion of testi
monial privileges first to physicians and later to psychotherapists. In
deed, as Part IV explains, in many respects, the broad view of waiver
is simply a reconfiguration of the classic arguments against the
privilege.45
A.

Origins of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

The psychothe rapist-patient privilege developed in the second half
of the twentieth century in the face of strong hostility to evidentiary
privileges in Anglo-American law. Privilege law generally reflects and
concerns "extrinsic social policy," perhaps more so tha n any other
realm of evidence.46 While other evidentiary rules aim to improve the
reliability of evidence, leading to enhanced truth-seeking by fact find
ers and more efficient trials, privileges provide benefits outside adju
dication, such as the preservation or protection of certa in
interpersonal relationships. Such purposes are central to many evi
dentiary privileges recognized today, including those shielding com
munications arising in marital, attorney-client, and clergy-believer
relationships.47 As a result, privileges are antithetical to the primary
object of evidentia ry trials, as expressed in one of the oft-cited maxims
in privilege cases: "The public [ ] has a right to every man's
evidence. " 48
43. See infra notes 69- 132 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 133- 324 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 227- 255 and accompanying text.
46. EDWARD J. IMWIN KELRIE D , THE N E W WIGMORE: E VIDENTIARY PRIVIL EGES§ 1.1, at 3
(2002).
47. Jd. § 1.1, at 4 (noting that numerous witnesses at the Congressional hearings on the pro

posed federal rules of evidence commented that " unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges pro
tect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom»).
48. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U .S. 1, 9 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U .S. 323, 331 (1950)).
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Few evidentiary privileges were recognized at common law and,
therefore, sta te legisla tures took the lead in establishing new privi
leges from the nineteenth century to the present.49 Privilege law often
reflects a struggle between legisla tures and courts, in which the latter
ta ke a narrow view of the codified privileges established by the for
me r.50 Indeed, many privileges- including t he psychothe rapist-pa
tie nt privilege- came about by intensive lobbying effo rts by
professionals seeking special status for their communications.51
Judges resented and resisted restrictions o n their authority to make
evide ntiary rulings, particularly where the restrictions resulted in the
exclusion of evidence that was quite often plainly releva nt to the is
sues before the court. 52
De an John Henry Wigmore , considered the preeminent American
evide nce scholar in the ea rly twentieth century, notably opposed the
wide recognition of evide ntiary privileges.53 Scholars such as Wig
more, who took a ra tionalist and e mpiricist approach to evidence,54
expressed skepticism that most privileges were truly necessary as
mechanisms in social relationships.55 Wigmore questioned any " hu
manistic rationales" fo r privileges where an empirical basis was lack
ing.56 That skepticism led him to dismiss most proposed privileges.57
Wigmore urged courts to take an approach of strict construction to the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147.
§ 3.2.2, at 127.
at 128.

I d.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
I d.

§ 3.1, at 119- 22.
§ 3.1, at 121, § 3.2.1, at 125. Another early critic of privileges, and one who influenced
Wigmore's approach, was the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who wrote that privileges
and other exclusionary rules interfered with the " natural " process of fact finding. Jd. § 2.5, at
113- 17. He also dismissed the proffered rationales for privileges because there was no empirical
proof to support them. I d. § 2.5, at 113- 17. As Bentham once stated: " Evidence is the basis for
justice: exclude evidence and you exclude justice." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF J u DI
CIAL EVIDENCE 38 (1827).
55. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.1, at 124-25, § 3.2.3, at 130-31.
56. Id. § 3.2.1, at 124-25. Wigmore dismissed humanistic rationales as mere " sentiments." Id.
at 125.
57. Wigmore developed an influential four -part test for privilege and argued that only a small
handful of asserted privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, fulfilled the requirements:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte
nance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedu
lously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
8 JoHN HENRY W IGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted).
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new privileges, and courts have generally heeded that suggestion.58
Wigmore's writings continue to pervade contemporary judicial opin
ions, as courts note that privileges are disfavored, are to be construed
strictly, and ultimately impede truth-seeking.s9
The physician-patient privilege, a forerunner of the psychothera
pist-patient privilege , was among those privileges that legislatures e n
acted and courts resisted. 60 By the turn of the twentieth century,
several sta tes had enacted a physician-patient privilege of some
kind. 61 Commentators' criticisms of the new privilege, including those
by Wigmore himself, were "vociferous." 62 One of the most-cited and
influential attacks on the privilege was that of Harvard Professor
Z echariah Chaffee, Jr. , who wrote tha t "[s]ecrecy in court is prima
facie calamitous, and is permissible only when we are very sure that
frankness will do more harm than good."63
The sa me year of Chaffee's call for abolition of the physician-pa
tient privilege, the American Law Institute's Committee on E vidence
issued a Model Code of E vidence.64 Initial drafts of the Model Code
contained no provision for a physician-patient privilege, but attorneys
from jurisdictions that already recognized such privilege lobbied fo r
its inclusion in the fin al draft.65 The rules provided for several fairly
broad exceptions to the privilege, including what is now commonly
referred to as a " patient-litigant exception":
There is no [physician-patient] privilege ... in an action in which the
condition of the patient is an eleme nt or factor of the claim or de
fe nse of th e patient or of any party claiming th rough or under the
patient or claimi ng as a beneficiary of the patien t th rough a co ntract
to which the patie nt is or was a party.66
58. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.2, at 129.
59. See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Wigmore's four 
part test in declining to recognize a parent-child privilege).
60. In 1828, the New York Legislature enacted the first state law codifying a physician-patient
privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, Vol. n, Part
III, c-7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73).
61. 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, fEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE
DURE § 5522, at 68 (West 1989).
62. Id. § 5522, at 70. Many rejected the privilege by employing Wigmore's four conditions,
essentially an instrumental and utilitarian approach. Id. § 5522, at 76; see also Comment, Waiver
of a Patient's Privilege, 31 YALE L.J. 529, 529- 30 (1922) (noting that many legislatures have
enacted such privileges in the face of " much hostile criticism») .
63. Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1942) .
64. MoDEL CoDE Evm. (1942). The code proposed to displace all common law privileges
with those set out in the model code. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 9.
65. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 220- 23; 2 MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PsY
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 269 (1952); see also Chaffee, supra note 63, at 616.
66. MoDEL CoDE Evm. R. 223(3).
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This exception was recognized in ma ny jurisdictions tha t had already
enacte d the privilege.67 Tying the exception t o the purported instru
me ntal ra tionale of the privilege itself, Wigmore noted:
T he who le reason for the privilege is th e patie nt's supposed unwill
ingness t hat th e ai lme nt s hould be disclosed to the wo rld at large ,
he nce t he bringing of a suit in which t he ve ry d ecla ratio n a nd much
more the proof discloses t he ailme nt to t he world at la rge is of itself
a n ind icatio n th at the su pposed re pugnancy to disclosure does no t
exi st. 68

By mid-century, commenta tors began discussing the need for a sep
ar ate psychot herapist-patie nt privilege .69 There were two primary im
petuses fo r the drive fo r a new privilege. First, the physician-patie nt
privilege, which could apply to psychiat ry, was not uniformly estab
lished throughou t t he country, notwithstanding its inclusion in the
Mode l Code. Thus, psychiatrists' ability to avoid testifying was tied to
t he insecure fate of other medical doctors, as described above.70 Sec
o nd, and more significantly, courts did not co nsistently apply the phy
sician-patient privilege to communications arising in psychot herapy.
Even where a physician-patient privilege was recognized- as was the
case in approximate ly thirt y states by 1960- questions occasionally
ar ose regarding whether treatme nt of " mental and e motional disor
de rs" was in fact " the practice of medicine," triggering t he operation
of the privilege.71 Further, the field of clinical psychology grew expo
ne ntially as psychologists began to provide t reatme nt in private prac
tice in the year s following World War 11.72 That expansion raised the
question of whether to exte nd the physicia n-patie nt privilege t o e n
compass non-physicians- such as lice nsed psychologists- o r t o distin
guish t he physicia n's privilege entirely and establish a new privilege
based, not upon the status of t he person with whom the communica
67. Present Status of Medical Privilege, 81 U . PA. L. REv. 755, 762 (1933); MoDEL CoDE
Evm., supra note 64, at 29.
68. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2388, at 855, quoted in J EAN V. Mc HALE, MEDICAL CoNFI
DENTIALITY AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE 111 (1993).
69. The question of whether there should be a psychotherapist-patient privilege is distinct
from issues regarding a psychotherapist's duty of confi dentiality, which was already well estab
lished in ethical rules an d statutes by this time. See DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WErNER,
THE PsYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL ExAMINATION 11- 24 (1987) .
70. David Lo uisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II: Confidential Communi 
calions, 41 MINN. L. REv. 731, 734 (1956). In fact, in New York, the new privilege was limited to
psychologists and followed the same scope as the state's attorney-client privilege. Jd.
71. Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and
the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J . PsYCHOL 733, 735 (1962) (internal q uot ation marks omitted) .
72. EDWARD SHORTER, A HrsTORY oF PsYCHIATRY: FRoM THE ERA oF THE AsYLUM TO
THE AGE OF PROZAC 293- 95 (1997); Roderick D. Buchanan, Legis/alive Warriors: American
Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Competing Claims Over Psychotherapy in the 1950s, 39 J . HrsT.
BEHAV. Sc1. 225, 228-46 (2003).
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tions occurred, but upo n the context and nature of the communica
tions themselves.
In the years that followe d, two influ ential scholars called fo r the
widespread recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. In
1956, Professor David Louisell argued tha t a privilege should be ex
tended to psychologists ' communications with patie nts in the context
of providing " psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy." 73 Four years
later, Professor Ralph Slovenko authored a wide ly regarded law re
view article on the subject urging the recognition of a privilege for
communications between psychia trists and their patie nts.74 He noted
that Wigmore had not conside red t he " psychotherapeutic relation
ship" when he expressed his disapproval of evidentiary privileges and
that many of t he criticisms leveled at the physician-pa tient privilege
did not apply to psychia try.7 5 Referring primarily to psychoa nalytic
treatment, including free association- which predomina ted the psy
chotherapy field at that time- Slovenko noted that the psychothera
peutic relationship "is unique and unlike any other that the patient or
anyone e lse is likely to encounter ... [as it] bear[s] little resemblance
to the usual social relationship."76 He concluded: " A privilege for
those receiving psychotherapy is necessa ry if t he psychiatric profes
sion is to fulfill its medical responsibility to its patients."77
In 1960, apparently buoyed by Professor Slovenko's arguments, the
fie ld of psychiatry launched a full campaign for the enactment of the
psychiatrist-pa tient privilege.78 The American Psychia tric Associa
tion's Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) issued a re
port outlining its argument for recognition of the privilege. The
report set fort h a classic instrumental rationale for the privilege:
" [T]here is wide agreement tha t confidentiality is a sine qua non fo r
73. Louisell, supra note 70, at 7~5.
74. Ralph Slovenko, Psychialry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv.
175 (1960) .
75. Jd. at 185, 199.
76. I d. at 185. He also noted the " difference of language between the inner and outer world "
and that there is a " higher degree of accuracy in data" in the latter. Jd. at 194. See also
SHORTER, supra note 72, at 146 (noting that by the mid-20th century, " [i]n the mind of the
public, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis became virtually synonymous") ; SHUMAN & WEINER,
supra note 69, at 34 (noting that the basis for the instrumental or utilitarian rationale for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is rooted in the psychoanalytic model of psychotherapy and its
emphasis on " total disclosure by patient to therapist") .
77. Slovenko, supra note 74, at 199. Interestingly, by 1974, Professor Slovenko had apparently
reversed course on the psychotherapist-patient privilege and concluded that, because the great
number of exceptions carved into the privilege " leav[es]little or no shield cover," the privilege
should be abolished. Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture
of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U . L. REv. 649, 649, 673 (1974).
78. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5522, at 89.
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successful psychiatric treatment."79 Thus, the psychiatrists argued, ab
sent a guarantee tha t the words exchanged with their patients could
not become evidence in a courtroom, patients could not fully e njoy
the potential benefits of their treatme nt. 80 The " model statute" pro
posed in the GAP report followed essentially the same approach that
had been adopted with respect to psychologists in six states81 in prior
years: to extend to communications between psychiatrists and pa
tients the same privilege recognized for communications between at
torneys and their clients.82 Where exceptions or waivers applied to
the attorney-client privilege, the same approach would be taken with
the psychiatrist-patient privilege.
The followi ng year, Connecticut became the first state to consider
adopting the GAP proposal. A committee convened by the state
branch of the American Psychiatric Association offered the Connecti
cut Legislature a bill that was more detailed and did not tie the scope
of the privilege to the attorney-client privilege.83 Thereafter, the Con
necticut statute, rather than the GAP proposal, served as a model psy
chotherapist-patient privilege.84 By the end of the decade, at least
four other states had enacted statutes based upon Connecticut's
statute.85
The Connecticut statute was the first psychotherapist-patient privi
lege to expressly include a patient-litigant exception. The statute pro
vided that there would be no privilege "in a civil proceeding in which
79. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F .R.D. 161, 260 (1969) (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIA
TRY, REPORT No. 45: CoNFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE
oF PsYCHIATRY 92 (1960)).
80. See also RoBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAw AND MENTAL HEALTH:
A CASE-BASED APPROACH 70 (2006) ("Confidentiality forms the foundation upon which suc
cessful mental health services stand.»).
81. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington had enacted stat
utes providing communications between a psychologist and client the same degree of protection
as those between an attorney and client. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735 n.8.
82. I d. at 735. The language of the GAP 's model statute read, in its entirety: "The confiden
tial relationship and communication between the psychiatrist and patient shall be placed on the
same basis as regards privilege, as provided by Jaw between attorney and client.» I d. at 736.
83. I d. ("The GAP statute suggest[ed) a host of problems which ca11 into question the appro
priateness of the attorney-client model. ") .
84. Paul Frederic Slawson, Patient-Litigant Exception: A Hazard to Psychotherapy, 21
ARCHIVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY 347, 349 (1969). Georgia had enacted a statute that provided
some level of protection to psychiatrists. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735. It provided
simply: "There are certain admissions and communications excluded from consideration of pub
lic policy. Among those are . . . [p]sychiatrists and patient.» Jd. at 735 n.7 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
85. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349 (Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and Maryland). In 1967, Cali
fornia enacted another influential psychotherapist-patient privilege statute as part of its new
evidence code. Jd.
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the patient introduces his mental condition as an e le ment of his claim
or defense . . . [if] the judge finds that it is more importa nt to the
interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the
relationship between patient and psychiatrist be protected."86 While
this language was somewhat similar to tha t in the Model Code 's physi
cian-patient privilege,87 the psychiatrists convinced the Connecticut
Legislature to include additional language enabling the trial court to
uphold the privilege even where the pa tient "introduce[d] his mental
condition as an element of his claim or defense." 88 Under the Con
necticut law, it was the burde n of the party seeking disclosure of the
confidential communications to de monstra te tha t the "interests of jus
tice" outweighed the need to protect the psychotherapist-patie nt
relationship.89
The inclusion of patient-litigant exceptions in the statutory psycho
therapist-patie nt privileges did not genera te much, if any, debate dur
ing enactment of these early privileges. 90 However, in 1969, as states
rapidly enacted specific psychotherapist-pa tient privileges that con
tained patient-litigant exceptions, one psychiatrist, Paul Frederic Slaw
son, published a critique of the exception as applied to
communications arising in psychotherapy. 91 While initially the excep
tion "seems reasonable and consona nt with our sense of fair play," he
noted, " [o]n second look, the words of the pa tient-litiga nt exception
fall out of sha rp focus. "92 Slawson questioned the notion of a pa tient's
" mental or emotional condition" as being an easily ascertainable con
struct.93 He also argued that what is revealed in psychotherapy notes
"is prone to distortion and consistently invites misundersta nding" and
therefore offers little " pertinent informa tion. " 94 He went so fa r as to
86. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737. Although the Connecticut statute has undergone
significant revision since its enactment, the essential language of that exception remains in effect
to this date. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-146c(c)(2) (psychologists), 146f(5) (psychiatrists)
(West & West Supp. 2008). A few other state statutes set forth similar balancing language today.
740 I LL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10(2) (West 2007) (exception applies only where a court deter
mines that " disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection
from any injury which disclosure is likely to cause"); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(c)
(West 2000).
87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
88. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737.
89. Jd.
90. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349.
91. I d. at 350-52. However, Slawson thought that such exception " makes sense" in the physi
cian-patient context. Jd.
92. Jd. at 350.
93. Jd. at 350-51. He was especially concerned about the abuse of the exception in divorce
proceedings. Jd.
94. Jd. at 351.
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assert that a psychiatric diagnosis " may be no more than the product
of a feeble inductive attempt made to satisfy administrative or actua
rial needs. "95 "Lawyers," he reasoned, "want facts and psychiatrists
can do remarkably well without them." 96
Dr. Slawson's cautions apparently made no impact. By 1996, all
states had codified some kind of psychotherapist-patient privilege ei
ther by statute or court rule,97 and each contained a patient-litigant
exception, either through a specific provision in the codification of the
rule or through a court ruling. 9 8

95. Jd. at 352.
96. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352.
rn. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n .11 (1996) (citing statutes and rules for aliSO states and
the District of Columbia). The Uniform Rules of Evidence were amended in 1fJ74 to be nearly
identical to the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, including the rejected psychothera
pist-patient privilege referenced infra at note 99. UN!F. R. Evm. 503 (1fJ74), 13C U.L.A. 324-25
(2004); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.3, at 237, § 4.3.1, at 242-43. The Uniform Rules were
again amended in 1999. See UN!F. R. Evm. 503 (amended 1999), 13A U .L.A . 91- 92 (2004). The
Uniform Rules created a single " Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege" with the pro
visions extending the privilege to all physicians in brackets. Id. The current version of the Uni
form Rule sets forth a patient-litigant exception that is essentially identical to that in rejected
Rule 504, and provides that the privilege does not apply to any communication:
relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental(,] or emotional condition of the patient in
any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the
patient's claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of the party's claim or defense.
UNIF. R. Evm. 503(d)(3).
98. See BARBARA A . WErNER & RoBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL IssuES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 213 (1993); Daniel A. Cantu, Comment, When Should Federal Courts Require Psychother
apists to Testify About Their Patients? An Interpretation of Jaffee v. Redmond, 1998 U . CHI.
LEGAL F. 375, 383 n.73. There is significant variation among the states in terms of the scope and
operation of the patient-litigant exception. Some state statutes delineate in which kinds of pro
ceedings the privilege may or may not operate. For example, some states have specific excep
tions for child custody proceedings. Nat'l Conf. of Comm 'rs. of Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Rules of Evidence 503 (1997 draft), at 2, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllarchives/ulc.
htm/uldurelev503.pdf; see, e.g. , MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e) (West 2000) . A sub
stantial number of statutes provide that the exception does not apply in workers compensation
cases. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL, T ESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES§ 7:23 (3d ed. 2005, updated
2007) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2380 n.6) . Others place medical malpractice cases, by
contrast, squarely within the exception. Jd.; see Mo. CooE ANN., CTs. & J u o. PRoc. § 9
109(d)(4) (LexisNexis 2006). And at least one state, Michigan, frames its exception so that if a
party asserts the privilege during discovery, he is foreclosed from offering evidence at trial on his
condition. Mic H. CT. R. 2.314(B)(2) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, if a party asserts that
the medical information is subject to a privilege and the assertion has the effect of preventing
discovery of medical information otherwise discoverable ... the party may not thereafter present
. . . any . .. evidence relating to the party's medical history or . . . condition."). Thus, rather than
finding a waiver of the privilege, the rule provides that invocation of the privilege operates to
limit the admissibility of evidence offered at trial by the plaintiff.
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The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts

The development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
federal courts took a markedly different route from tha t in the states.
In contrast to the sta tes' statutory privileges , federal privilege law con
tinues to develop through the common law. E ven after enacting the
Federal Rules of E vidence in 1975 , Congress left it to the courts to
de termine which, if any, privileges would be recognized in all but strict
diversity jurisdiction cases, based upon judges' own " reason and expe
rience."99 The federal courts, however, continue to display a reluc
tance to recognize privileges. Many heed the cautious language of the
Supre me Court's 1974 opinion, United States v. Nixon, in which the
Court rejected a broad view of preside ntial privilege, underscoring
that privileges " are not lightly created nor expa nsively construed , for
they are in derogation of the search for truth."100 Until the Supreme
Court addressed this issue in 1996, federal courts considered the mer
its and application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on a case
by-case basis and were sharply divided on whethe r to recognize the
privilege and on its appropriate contours.101
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court addressed the psychother
apist-patie nt privilege in a le thal force civil rights case brought by the
survivors of Ricky Allen, Sr. against Mary Lu Redmond, a police of
99. FED. R. Evm. 501. Among the draft federal rules proposed by the Supreme Court were
several evidentiary privileges, including proposed Rule 504, a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Rules of Evidence for United Stales Courts and Magistrates, 56 F .R.D. 183, 24~ (1972). The
commentary noted that CAL. Evro. CoDE§§ 1010-26 (West 2008) and CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 52
146a (1966 Supp.) served as two of the " illustrative statutes" consulted during the proposed
rule's drafting. !d. at 242. The drafters also concluded that the rationale for such privilege had
been convincingly stated in the GAP Proposal, supra note 79, as well as in Professor Slovenko's
article, supra note 74. !d. The proposed privilege included a patent-litigant exception typical of
that found in many state statutes. The inclusion of the proposed privileges proved extremely
controversial and Congress removed them from the final enactment. In their place , Congress
enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 which provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. Evm. 501; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The
Strength of the lngroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REv. 41 (2006).
100. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
101. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
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ficer who shot and killed Allen when responding to a report of a
fight. 102 Plaintiffs' counsel learned during discovery that, after the
shooting, Redmond had participated in approximately fifty counseling
sessions with a social worker employed by the municipality. 103 The
plaintiffs' attorneys sought the records in discovery "for use in cross
examining Redmond,"104 most likely because they hoped that such
records would contain valuable admissions about the incident such as
statements of guilt or remorse, or a description of the events at vari
ance with others Redmond had provided. Redmond' s attorneys and
counselor refused to produce the counseling records or to permit wit
nesses to respond to questions regarding the counseling sessions, de
spite court orders compelling disclosure. 105 As a sanction, the trial
court instructed the jury that they could make an adverse inference
about the content of the records since there was "no legal justifica
tion " for the refusal to produce them.106 The court e ntered judgment
for plaintiffs on the jury's verdict of $545,000.to7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.108 The
panel concluded that Evidence Rule SOl's " reason and experience"
standard led to the conclusion that the federal common law should
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.109 However, in lan
guage echoing the standard first seen in the 1960 Connecticut stat
ute,110 the panel also noted that the privilege would not apply where
" in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of
the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs the patient's
privacy interests." 111 The court concluded that the privilege should be
recognized in that case based upon the minimal probative value of the
therapy records as compa red with Redmond 's substa ntial privacy in
terests.112 Noting that the circuit courts were divided on the issue of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege (two had recognized the privi

102. Jd. at 4.
103 . Jd. at 5.

104. Jd.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Jd.
Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 6.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), affd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) .
Jd. at 1355- 56.
CoN N . GEN. STAT. A N N . § 52-146 (1966 Supp.); see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
Jd. at 1358.
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lege,113 while four rejected it114), the Supreme Court granted certio
rari and affirmed. u 5
In recognizing the psychothe rapist-patient privilege, the Court re
lied almost exclusively on an instrumental rationale. Justice Stevens
noted that the privilege is " ' rooted in the imperative need for confi
dence and trust,' "116 since "effective psychotherapy" requires a pa
tient to be "willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts ,
emotions, memories, and fears." 117 The psychotherapist-patient privi
lege would also "serve public ends,"118 because the "mental health of
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of tran
scendent importance." 119 The majority contrasted these benefits with
the merely "modest" evide ntiary benefit if the re were no privilege.
" Without a privilege," the Court reasoned, " much of the desirable evi
dence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into
being."120 The majority also gave great weight to the fact tha t, by this
point in time, " all 50 States and the District of Columbia have e nacted
into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."tzt
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Seventh
Circuit, it tinkered with the lower court's conceptualization of the
privilege. Specifically, it rejected the " balancing" approach employed
by the panel and instead recognized the privilege as absolute. 122 The
Court incorporated and applied the reasoning first articulated in
Upjohn Co. v. United Statest23;
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in
the con fi de ntial conversation " must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.
An uncertain privilege , o r one which purports to be certain but re
113. In re Doe, %4 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
114. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 863 (1994);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United
States, 493 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
u.s. 853 (1976).
115. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7, 18 (1996).
116. I d. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U .S. 40, 51 (1980)) (discussing the attor
ney-client privilege).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 12.
121. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 12.
122. Id. at 17- 18.
123. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U .S. 383 (1981).
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suits in widely varyi ng applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all ." 124

The Court did not suggest what circumsta nces would give rise to a
waiver of the privilege; it simply acknowledged in a footnote: " Like
other tes timonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the pro
tection."125 In a separa te footnote, the Court also acknowledged that
there could be occasions where the privilege would need to "give
way," such as "if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist. "126
Commentators have noted that Jaffee appea rs to be an aberration
when compared with the general hostility of the federal courts, includ
ing the Supreme Court, to the recognition of privileges. 127 Professor
Imwinke lried reasons that the "extraordinary fact pattern[,]a highly
plausible instrumental argument ... [and] unanimous support for the
privilege among the states" led to the result in Jaffee. 128 H owever,
the decision did not silence the critics of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, and Justice Scalia's dissent reflects many of their criti
cisms.129 Notably, contemporary commentators and researchers con
tinue to question the instrumental rationale upon which the privilege
is based.130 Nonetheless, the holding of Jaffee established a psycho
124. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393) .
125. Id. at 15 n.14.
126. Id. at 18 n.19.
127. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.2.4, at 229.
128. Id. at 231.
129. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22- 25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking aim at the instrumental rationale,
among other things).
130. For a discussion of the various rationales offered and questioned with respect to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, see generally SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 39, 25-43
("There is substantial disagreement about the extent of confidentiality required for effective
therapy . . . . The question of the relationship between patients' complete openness and the
quality of their treatment has yet to be established.»). The authors conducted a series of empiri
cal studies to test the instrumental rationale and concluded that, "while confidentiality is impor
tant in therapeutic relationships, privilege is not." Id. at 113. They also noted, however, that
"(t)he deontological argument for a psychotherapist-patient privilege, frequently ignored by the
privilege's proponents in common law jurisdictions, is persuasive both on its own terms and as a
vehicle for avoiding the quagmire created by the assumptions underlying the utilitarian argu
ments.» Id. at 135.
For an excellent analysis and critique of the Court's application of the instrumental rationale
in Jaffee, see Edward J . Imwinkelried, The Rivalry between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of
the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) , 49 HAS
TINGS L.J. 969 (1998). See also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 503-08; Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the
Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 145 (2004); Edward J. l mwinkelried, A Psy 
chological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights
from the Literature on Self-Disclosure , 38 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 707 (2004) . Professor lmwinkelried
notes that the purported empirical support for the rationale does not hold up under scrutiny.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 507. He suggests a preferable rationale he refers to as
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therapist-patient privilege that was to be recognized and e nforced in
the context of litigation, without regard to the principles with which
courts generally concern the mselves during discovery disputes such as
relevance, necessity, and fairness to the party seeking discovery of
privileged communications. 131 H owever, in the yea rs since the opin
ion, the Supre me Court' s absolute privilege has emerged as one that is
truly " uncertain" 132 and ultimately illusory.
IV.

IMPLIED WAIVER oF THE PsYCH OTHERAPIST -PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDE RAL CouRTS

While Jaffee answered the basic questions that had previously di
vided federal courts-whether the re should be a federal psychothera
pist-patient privilege, to which professions should it apply, and
whether the privilege should be absolute-the most common question
in federal courts regarding the enforcement of the privilege did not
arise in that case. Namely, under what circumstances should a court
decline to e nforce the privilege where doing so would limit a defen
dant 's ability to access records and testimony tha t may be relevant to
a plaintiffs claim? The federal courts have generally framed the issue
as whether a plaintiff's allegations and claims have resulted in an im
plied "waiver" of the psychotherapist-patient privilege such tha t the
psychotherapy records are subject to discovery. H owever, the case
law on this issue generates more questions than answers.
A.

A Problem of Terminology: "Waiver" Versus " Exception"

When considering the approaches to waiver of the psychotherapist
patient privilege in federal courts, courts and codifiers are inexact and
inconsistent with their terminology. What developed in the state leg
islatures as the " patient-litigant exception" to the psychothe rapist-pa
tient privilege-where the patie nt has somehow injected his or her
mental condition into litigation she may not simultaneously assert the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to limit discovery of any records of
such mental condition- emerged in the federal courts in the terminol
ogy of the " in issue," or " at issue" waiver of the privilege. 133 In both
the " humanistic rationale," which is based upon core democratic principles of privacy and auton
omy. !d. at 509. While some existing privileges do not pass muster under that rationale, Profes
sor Imwinkelried concludes that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would serve such
principles. !d. at 509-12.
131. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 17- 18.
132. !d. at 18.
133. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 873-85. The notion of an issue-driven waiver
is not unique to the psychotherapist-patient privilege but can arise in the context of the attorney
client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, among others. !d.
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contexts, the privilege holder is unable to resist discovery requests fo r
me ntal health information, but quite different terms are used to de
scribe t he mechanism that brings about such result.l 34
Commenta tors analyzing the general concept of "waiver" consist
ently e mphasize the central roles of intentionality and voluntariness as
indispensible preconditions for a finding of waiver.135 Professor Jes
sica Wilen Berg noted tha t the requirement of "intention" contains
the corresponding requirement that " the actor must unde rstand the
act and its consequences. "136 Similarly, Professor Edwa rd Rubin ob
served that the most " general " definition of waiver is "a decision not
to exercise a right, or, more precisely, a judicial finding t hat a person
has lost a right as a result of his decision. "137 R ubin argued that, since
one could argue that someone waived his right to liberty by commit
ting a crime, to effectuate a waiver the decision must be "directly re
lated to t he right in question."138 Thus, each of t hese formulations
looks to an affirma tive act by an individual holding a legal right to
de termine if the individual has waived her right. Indeed, this fra me
work calls into question the very notion of an "implied" waiver and
suggests that the concept should be applied with caution. 139
In America n law, a testimonial privilege is a legal right that, once
held, can be waived, and t he general terminology and conceptualiza
tion of waiver, therefore , apply as they would to other rights that a
person may waive.140 Generally, waiver of a privilege is a failure to
assert the privilege at a juncture where one would be expected to do
so, such as through voluntary disclosure, or a failure to object to dis
closure in other phases of litigation. 1 4 1 The law recognizes both im
plied and actual waivers of privileges by a wide ra nge of actions,
134. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543, at n.39.
135. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 Hou s. L. REv. 281, 306-07 (2003)
(describing these requir ements as: "voluntariness (freedom from controUing interference) and
intention to act (which includes knowledge and capacity)»); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 48!W!3 (1981).
136. Berg, supra note 135, at 314.
137. Rubin , supra note 135, at 483. Rubin disputed that intention and knowledge are merely
" criteria by which the quality of a particular decision can be judged. " !d.
138. !d. at 484.
139. Similarly, Slawson, in arguing the privilege should only be set aside where there is a
waiver by the patient, noted that the concept of waiver " implies fuU knowledge and understand
ing of what is being waived " and " awareness of the consequences of [such] disclosure." Slawson,
supra note 84, at 351. He suspected that patients in fact have little understanding of what is in
their psychiatrists' notes and charts. !d.
140. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 842.
141. See, e.g. , 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C KIRKPATRICK, f EDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 5:11 (3d ed. 2007).
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inclu ding by execution of releases of information,142 by contract,143
and by disclosure to third parties. 144 The assumption is t hat any such
act is " an autonomous choice by t he holder" of the privilege. 145 This
approach is reflected in the specific section o n waiver set forth in re
jected Federal R ule of E vide nce 511 and similar provisions in the u ni
form and model rules under which "waiver" occu rs only t hrou gh
voluntary disclosu re or consent to othe rs' disclosure of t he privileged
communication. 146
The term " exception" as applied to privileges, such as the "danger
ous patient" or "crime frau d " exceptions to t he psychothe rapist-pa
tie nt privilege, generally limits the privilege based upon t he content of
t he communication, su ch as a threat to do harm to others. 147 In these
insta nces, t he privilege is rega rded as never attaching to t he communi
cation. By contrast, t he concept of waiver is more appropriately con
sidered after the fact of the confidential communication, o nce the
privilege and the accompanying rights of enforcement have at
tached.148 Thus, a patient may enjoy t he privilege for an extended
142. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 853.
143. Jd.
144. Jd. at 859.
145. Jd. at 843; see also id. § 6.12.4, at 877 (noting that filing a pleading containing an allega
tion concerning the substance of confidential communications is " an affirmative act placing the
issue[s] in dispute" which may trigger the "at issue" waiver doctrine of privileges).
146. For example, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides, in the section titled " Waiver of
Privilege":
(a) Voluntary disclosure. A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against
disclosure waives the privilege if the person or the person's predecessor, while holder
of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of
the privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.
(b) Involuntary disclosure. A claim of privilege is not waived by a disclosure that was
compelled erroneously or made without an opportunity to claim the privilege.
UNtF. R u LES Evm. 510, 13A U.L.A. 100 (2004); see also Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F .R.D. 183, 258-59 (1972) (setting forth text of Proposed Rule 511,
upon which Uniform Rule Sll(a) is based).
147. Some federal courts and several state evidence rules recognize a so-called "crime-fraud "
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory
P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts are divided on the so-called "dangerous
patient" exception. Compare United States v. Glass, 133 F .3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998) (hold
ing that there may be an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege where disclosure is
the only means to avoid harm), with United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991- 92 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en bane) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception), and United States v. Hayes,
227 F.3d 578, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception in
criminal cases) . See also Orenstein, supra note 17, at 687 (questioning why the courts struggling
with the dangerous patient exception did not consider whether the communications would fall
under the crime-fraud exception).
148. Cf. Comment, supra note 62, at 530-31 (noting that the physician-patient privilege "con
fers a power on the patient" which can be either exercised or waived only by the patient
himself).
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period of time- even decades- before some subsequent action by the
pa tient, such as executing a release, vitiates the privilege. 149 This dis
tinction appears in Jaffee , where Justice Stevens notes, " [l]ike other
testimonial privileges , the patient may of course waive the protec
tion,"150 and "we do not doubt that there are situations in which the
privilege must give way. " 1 5 1 Thus, in a case in which the privilege at
issue is framed in broad terms, the Court itself appears to be ma king a
distinction between "waiver," which is premised on actions by the pa
tient, and exceptions to the privilege itself which turn on the
"situation. "152
This variation in terminology with respect to t he same mecha nism is
significa nt because it may serve as one explanation of federal courts '
failure to approach t he question as one truly concerning a "waiver," as
that general concept is understood and applied in the law.153 As
noted above, the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege in the sta tes is
largely a creature of statute or rule. Following the Model Code, the
revised U niform Rules of Evidence, and the early Connecticut and
California statutes, a significant number of sta tes include a " patient
litigant exception" in t he privilege's codification.154 In the fe de ral
courts, the term " patie nt-litigant exception" is essentially absent from
the federal common law of the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege.
H owever, the same reasoning unde rlying the exception in state courts
is now seen in the analysis of implied waiver in federal courts, as dis
cussed below.155
The unde rlying principles of waiver, in whatever context, require
courts, when determining whether there has been a waiver, to focus
exclusively on the knowledge, decisions, and actions of the holde r of
the right allegedly waived. Considera tions such as the potential bene
149. Professor Slovenko suggested that the distinction should be between waiver and " termi
nation" of the privilege and that the latter is a more accurate description of the operation of
filing suit in which a patient's mental or emotional condition is at issue and that "the term
'waiver' ought to apply only in the situation where the patient voluntarily gives up his privilege
and requires the physician to testify." RALPH SwvENKo, PsYCHOTHERAPY, CoNFIDENTIALITY,
AND PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATION 155 (1966) .
150. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996) (emphasis added).
151. Jd. at 18 n.19 (emphasis added).
152. See also SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 7 (drawing a distinction between whether
the privilege is " waived by the patient" and exceptions to the privilege). Thus, the state law
" patient-litigant exception" could be considered a misnomer.
153. See 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n.44 (noting that applying the concept
of "waiver" to the patient-litigant exception " distort[s] the waiver doctrine").
154. See Cantu, supra note 98, at 383 n.73 (referring to specific statutes or court rules, rather
than limitations emerging from court decisions, "[t]wenty-nine states provide no privilege for
information raised as evidence for a claim or defense") .
155. See infra notes 156-324 and accompanying text.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

106

[Vol. 58:79

fits flowing to others if the right is not e nforced, while useful and im
porta nt when determining a privilege's exceptions and limitations at
the time of its initial construction, have no place in the analysis of
waiver. However, as the review of the case law below reveals , the
general principles that apply to the questions of waiver of rights are
largely absent from the analysis of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa
tie nt privilege in federal courts. The decisions too infreque ntly con
sider the plaintiffs actions and choices in direct relation to the right
allegedly waived. Indeed, most federal courts are not in fact trea ting
the issue of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a
question of waiver at all.
B.

The Federal Courts' Approach to Waiver

The case law concerning waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege revolves around a basic question with a very complex answer:
What does it mea n to place one's " mental condition" in issue such that
it effectuates a waiver of the privilege? In Jaffee , the Court addressed
the existence of the privilege in one of the very rare cases in which a
court considered the privilege without also grappling with the concept
of waiver, because it was a defendant asserting the privilege in that
case.1 56 After previously denying certiorari in at least five cases where
the existence of the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege was squa rely at
issue, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the privilege question
in a case with no waiver issue. 1 57 Since Jaffee , the Supreme Court has
been squarely presented with the issue of the appropriate approach to
questions arising under the "at issue" waiver, but has declined, as re
cently as 2007, to grant certiorari on such issue. 1 58 Indeed , as was the
case with t he privilege itself prior to Jaffee , courts are left stumbling
along, trying to fashion a rule on a case-by-case basis.1 59
156. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 5-6.
157. Jd. at 7.
158. In Doe v. Oberwei.s Dairy , 127 S. a. 1815 (2007), the Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari in an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Doe v.
Oberwei.s Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006), discussed infra at note 183 and accompanying text.
Plaintiff-appellant phrased the question presented for review as follows:
Under what cir cumstances does a Plaintiff in a Title VII case, who seeks compensatory
damages under Title VII for emotional distress, waive the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege that this Court recognized in Jaffee? Guidance is needed to resolve the split in the
circuit courts and in the more than sixty district courts that have reported their
decisions.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, D o e, 127 S. a. 1815 (No. 06-735).
159. One should always be cautious when drawing generalizations about what happens in liti
gation, including discovery, based upon written opinions that find their way into official report
ers or electronic databases. Given the state of the case Jaw, or ignorance of it, plaintiffs' counsel
may not challenge defense attorneys' attempts to obtain counseling records, or to take the depo
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"Broad" Versus "Narrow" Approaches to Waiver

Nearly all of the discussion and analysis of waiver of the psycho
therapist-patient privilege divide the judicial approaches into two
camps: broad and narrow. 16° Courts that take a broad approach to
waiver are less scrutinous of a defendant's assertion that there has
been a waiver and are more likely to order disclosure of psychother
apy records.161 By contrast, those taking the narrow, minority ap
proach162 are more likely to deny disclosure by finding that a
plaintiff's actions in the litigation fell short of that required to effectu
ate a waiver.163 However, the procedural posture of the cases, the
rationales applied by the courts, and other factors reveal that the case
law cannot be analyzed and critiqued using this simple dichotomy.164
The "broad approach" label generally applies to cases in which
courts find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege based
solely upon a plaintiff's assertion of a nonspecific claim for emotional
distress, though the plaintiff has not offered the testimony of an ex
pert psychological witness to support her claim.165 Courts adopting a
more narrow approach will usually decline to find a waiver unless the
plaintiff has listed her psychotherapist as a witness for trial or other
wise proposed to place the privileged communications directly or indi
rectly in issue.I66
sition of a current or former treating psychotherapist. If there is a discovery dispute, it is likely
that it would not result in a reported decision, but rather would be resolved through a telephonic
conference with a federal magistrate judge. See FED. R. C.v. P. 37(a)(3). Thus, one can assume
that in a significant number of federal civil rights actions in which the plaintiff's psychiatric his
tory is sought, any controversy regarding discovery of mental health treatment is unknown to
those outside of the proceedings. Cf Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimi
nation, 84 N.C. L. REv. 927, 927 (2006) (noting that the prevalence of confidential settlements in
workplace discrimination claims "skews empirical studies of discrimination litigation"). None
theless, there are a sufficient number of written decisions addressing implied waiver of the psy
chotherapist-patient privilege to provide a good indication of how the question is generally
framed and addressed in the courts.
160. See generally Aronson, supra note 10, at 605- 07; McDonnell, supra note 10, at 1370.
161. See, e.g. , Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001) .
162. See, e.g. , Cohen v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-6780, 2007 WL 2789272, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007).
163. See, e.g. , Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R. D. 526, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
164. See Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R. D. 551, 556 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("This Court
. . . has found that, upon close inspection, many of the cases purporting to reject the narrow view
and adopt a broad view actually take a middle ground.").
165. See, e.g. , Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F .3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006); Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No . 1:06-CV-211, 2007
WL 3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007); E EOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No.
8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007); Manessis v. New York City Dep't of
Tr ansp., No. 02 CIV. 359SASDF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N .Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
166. See, e.g. , Barnett v. PA Consulting Group Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at *4
(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007); Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9
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The leading case under the na rrow approach is Vand erbilt v. Town
of Chilmark, 167 decided the year afte r Jaffee. Drawing o n case law
analyzing alleged waivers of attorney-client privilege, the Vanderbilt
court reasoned t hat a waiver results not from the plaintiff raising an
issue arguably rela ted to her mental health, but rather from offering
communications with a mental health care provider as evidence in the
litigation.168 Thus , absent notice t hat the plaintiff intended to call her
therapist as a witness who would t hen reveal privileged communica
tions, there could be no waiver. 169 Some courts have followed this
rationale and concluded that, where t he plaintiff has not listed her
therapist as a potential expert, there has been no waiver of the psy
cho therapist-patient privilege.170 Simila rly, in cases where a plaintiff
has listed her t reating psychotherapist as a witness, defendants gener
ally prevail in their assertions that there has been a waiver of the
privilege. 171
The approach to waiver taken in Vanderbilt and by courts tha t fol
low the opinion is generally consistent with the essential principles of
waiver. The court focused its analysis on whether the privilege
holder, the plaintiff, had undertaken an act directly related to the priv
ileged communica tions (i.e. offering t he communications in support of
her claims) that was plainly inconsistent with an assertion of the privi
lege such that it ca n be properly regarded as a waiver of the privilege.
Conside rations such as t he impact on the parties ' positions, the rele
vance of the information, and notions of fairness play little, if any role ,
in these courts ' de termination of whet her there has been a waiver.172
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006); Greenberg v. Smolka, No . 03 Civ. 8572, 2006 WL 1116521, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639-40 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Allen v.
Cook County Sheriff's Dep't , No. 97 C 3625, 1999 WL 168466, at *2 (N.D. l11. Mar. 17, 1999) .
167. Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
168. Id. at 228-29; see also Hucko , 185 F.R. D. at 529 (drawing similar analogy to waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and concluded that there was no waiver because the plaintiff did not
plan to offer evidence of " prior consultations with psychotherapists in order to prove his claim of
emotional harm").
169. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229.
170. See Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534 (E.D.
Ark. Sept. 21 2006); Kunstler, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9; Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639; cf. United
States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d. 1187, 1190 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the defendant was not
entitled to discover the victim's counseling records when victim did not intend to discuss the
" content of her counseling sessions" at the sentencing hearing).
171. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Colo. 2004); Adams v. Ardcor,
196 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Wise. 2000); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield,
Inc., 967 F . Supp. 346, 350 (C.D. Ill. 1997) .
172. See, e.g. , Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D.
Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (" (T]he proper subject for the waiver analysis is whether the substance of a
particular communication has been placed in issue, not whether the topic of communication is
relevant to the factual issues of the case.").
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H owever, the maj ority of courts that have considered the question
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege have taken a very
different course.173 Doe v. City of Chula Vista provides an example of
the re asoning employed by courts taking a broader view of waiver in
the context of emotional distress claims. 174 The opinion is re marka
ble in two respects: first, it contains a lengthy analysis of the relative
me rits of the narrow-versus-broad approaches, and second, it reverses
a magistrate's decision that provided an even lengthier analysis lead
ing to precisely the opposite conclusion on the same fac ts. 175 A for
me r assistant city attorney filed a claim for discrimination on the basis
of perceived disability, alleging that her employer terminated her after
she refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation.176 Pointing to the
plaintiff's claim for e motional distress damages, the defendants sought
documents of "each and every mental and psychological disorder" for
which the plaintiff had sought treatment in the previous ten yea rs.177
The discovery dispute was presented to the magis trate judge who, af
ter reviewing the case law, found the " narrow view" to be more per
suasive.178 Nonetheless, the magistrate ordered the disclosure of the
names of healthcare providers who treated the plaintiff within the pre
vious year and permitted the defendants to inquire into other "events
and circumstances" in the plaintiff's life to determine if there were any
other potential causes of e motional distress.179
In response to the defendants' objection to the magistrate judge's
ruling, the district court significantly broadened the information to
which the defendants could have access. The judge first reviewed the
rationales and approaches of the two competing lines of cases regard
ing waiver and concluded that the United States Supreme Court
would adopt the broad view of waiver.180 Since the plaintiff there
sought emotional distress damages, the court concluded, her " emo
tional health, near the time of the defendants' alleged misconduct, is
173. Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98 Civ. 9009, 2003 WL 1618530, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2003).
174. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The issue arose in an ADA
case, but because the plaintiff asserted a claim only under the " regarded as" prong of the defini
tion of disability, and did not allege an actual disability, the ADA claim did not come into play in
the waiver question.
175. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
176. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 562.
177. Jd. at 563.
178. Fritsch , 187 F.R.D. at 629- 30.
179. Jd. at 633.
180. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 568. The court based this conclusion, in part, on the "Court's" (albeit
through an advisory committee and twenty-five years earlier) inclusion of a patient-litigant ex
ception in the psychotherapist-patient privilege ultimately rejected by Congress. Jd.
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an issue in the litigation" and she "is relying on her e motional state to
make her case." 18 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff could not shield her psy
chotherapy records from discovery.
Several other courts have followed the same basic reasoning of Doe
v. City of Chula Vista , but few have provided an in-depth discussion of
the issue. 182 Three federal courts of appeals fo llow the broad ap
proach, but none has offered close analysis of the controversy in the
lower courts. In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, writing on behalf of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner noted
simply, " If a plaintiff by seeking damages for e motional distress places
his or her psychological sta te in issue, the defendant is entitled to dis
cover any records of that sta te." 183 Similarly, in Schoffstall v. Hender
son , the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff
had " place[d] ... her medical condition at issue" by seeking emotional
distress damages and therefore had waived the psychotherapist-pa
tient privilege. 184 Fmally, in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that by seeking emo
tional distress damages, the plaintiff had " put her emotional sta te at
issue in the case" and therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Iss
More recently, two federal appeals courts have indicated that they
would follow a different approach. 186 However, neither court was re
quired to address squarely the issue of whether a claim for emotional
distress is a basis for finding a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. In Koch v. Cox, an employment discrimination case in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiff
chose to withdraw his claim for e motional distress.187 In reversing the
district court' s finding that the plaintiff had nonetheless waived the
privilege by acknowledging in discovery responses that he had been
diagnosed with depression, the panel indicated that it found Vander
bilt's reasoning more persuasive than the Oberweis Dairy and Schoff
181. Jd. at 569.
182. See, e.g. , Waggaman v. Villanova Univ., No. 04-4447, 2006 WL 2045486, at *2 (E. D. Pa.
July 14, 2006); Manessis v. New York City Dep't of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359, 2002 WL 31115032,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL
910443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); Calder v. T CI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV
01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2001); Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 Civ. 9588, 1998
WL 164823, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998) .
183. Doe V . Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 s. a. 1815
(2007).
184. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) .
185. Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007).
186. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384 (D .C. Cir. 2007).
187. Koch, 489 F.3d at 388.
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stall decisions, particularly with respect to the Vanderbilt court's
analogy to the attorney-client privilege.188 The panel noted that, were
it to follow the broad view of waiver adopted by the district court, it
would "sub silentio ... overrule" Jaffee, without the authority to do
so. 189 The court reasoned t hat it must "supply a sta ndard for deter
mining whether a patient has waived the privilege ... t hat does not
eviscerate the privilege." 190 Accordingly, the court conclude d tha t a
plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege only when he has
" bas[ed] his claim upon t he psychothe rapist's communications with
him " or " 'selectively disclos[ed] part of a privileged communication in
o rder to gain an advantage in litigation.' " 191
Similarly, in In re Sims the Court of Appeals fo r the Second Circuit
granted the plaintiffs request for a writ of mandamus after concluding
that the trial court in that excessive fo rce case had abused its discre
tion when it ordered the disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric
records. 192 The plaintiff had expressly and unambiguously withdrawn
his claims fo r emotional distress damages , and the issue of the plain
tiffs psychiatric history arose only in response to defense counsel's
questions during the plaintiffs deposition.193 The appeals court found
the reasoning in Koch to be persuasive and, in reversing t he district
court's order, emphasized t he " transcendent importance of t he psy
chotherapist-patient privilege."194

188. Id. at 391. The panel also implicitly rejected the holding in a prior employment discrimi
nation case, Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F . Supp. 2d 136, 138 (D.D.C. 2005) , which found a waiver
based solely upon a claim that the plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress requiring treat
ment with a psychotherapist. Koch, 489 F.3d at 387. The district court itself issued an opinion
distinguishing Kalinoski and taking a fairly narrow approach a week after Koch was argued but
before it was decided. Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at
*4 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) .
189. Koch, 489 F.3d at 390.
190. Jd.
191. Jd. (quoting S.E.C. v. Lavin , 111 F.3d 921, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ) (construing the marital
privilege). By rejecting the defendant's arguments that the plaintiffs discovery responses trig
gered a waiver of the privilege, the Koch court implicitly recognized that a response under the
compulsion of the broad discovery rules does not satisfy the voluntariness requirement of a
waiver. See also Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that there was no waiver of patient-physician privilege by revealing communications in response
to deposition questioning by opposing counsel) ; Kromenacker v. Blystone, 539 N.E.2d 675, 678
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) .
192. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 141 (2d Cir . 2008).

193. Jd.
194. Jd. at 134.
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"Garden-Variety Emotional Distress" Versus Specific Psychiatric
Injury

Several courts have adopted the category of "garde n-variety emo
tional distress " as a means to differentia te cases where there has not
been an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.195
This distinction was apparently first coined in a discovery ruling in
Sabree v. United Brothers of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local
No. 33 , a pre-Jaffee race discrimination case.196 A magistrate judge
initially de termined that the court should recognize a psychotherapist
patient privilege. 197 In concluding tha t there was no applicable "ex
ception" to the psychotherapist-patient privilege present, she noted:
"Sabree has not placed his mental condition at issue. Sabree makes a
' garden-va riety' claim of emotional distress , not a claim of psychic in
jury or psychiatric disorder resulting from the alleged discrimina
tion."198 The courts that have employed this distinction will decline to
order disclosure of psychotherapy records if a plaintiff asserts a claim
for e motional distress without alleging a specific diagnosable mental
condition as a component of compensatory damages or without offer
ing the testimony of an expert witness to prove emotional distress.199
" Garden-variety emotional distress" is a legal term , not a psychiat
ric term ,200 and it is not a particularly useful construct.2°1 One com
mentator refers to it as a " vegeta rian metaphor" used to distinguish
" meatier" claims of emotional distress.202 A few courts have at

195. See Gott, supra note 10, at 97- 100; Mara Kent & Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights
Claimants: Should They Be Required to Give Up Their Physician-Patient Privilege When Alleg
ing Garden-Variety Emotional Distress? , 77 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 479, 480 (2000).
196. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426
(D. Mass. 1989). One commentator has referred to the decision as "landmark.» Sherry L. Rus
chioni, Confidentiality of Mental Health Records in Federal Courts: The Path Blazed by Sabree v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local No. 33, 38 NEw ENG. L. REv.
923, 924 (2004).
197. Sabree, 126 F.R.D. at 426. The magistrate judge appears to have reached this conclusion
in part due to the sensitive nature and marginal relevance to the proceedings of the plaintiffs
psychotherapy records, which she had reviewed in camera. !d.
198. !d.
199. See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534, at
*5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (referring to those courts employing the garden-variety distinction
as taking the "middle approach"); EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224-25 (N.D. Cal.
2006); Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
200. Saul Rosenberg & Mark Levy, Unwarranted Restrictions on the Independent Examination
of Emotional Damages, DEF. CoMMENT, Spring 2004, at 11- 12 (critiquing development of the
term "garden-variety» in the context of compeUed mental examinations as a "scientifically
meaningless concept").
201. See RANDOM Ho USE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 2006), which
defines garden-variety as "common, usual, or ordinary; unexceptional."
202. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n .94.2.
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tempted to define "garden-variety" emotional distress, while others
simply employ the term to describe a plaintiff's claims.203 Many
courts employing such terminology place great weight on the presence
of a psychiatric diagnosis.204 But a diagnosis reveals little in terms of
the severity of emotional damages. While a plaintiff may indicate in
response to discovery queries that she has been diagnosed with a par
ticular mental disorder, it does not necessarily follow that she will of
fer evidence of such diagnosis to support her claim for damages. 205
Further, it is highly unusual for an individual receiving psychother
apy of some kind to not be diagnosed with a condition found in the
American Psychia tric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders.206 Insurance companies and publicly funded
health care programs invariably require a clinical diagnosis in order to
approve coverage for psychothe rapy,2°7 and there are several diagno
ses appropria te for temporary or mild conditions.208 Accordingly, a
plaintiff's diagnosis with a mental disorder is not a sound basis for

203 . See, e.g., Santos v. Boeing Co., No . 02-C-9310, 2003 WL 23162439, at *2 (N.D.lll. Oct. 21,
2003) (denying defendant's motion to compel discovery of plaintiff's mental health records).
204. See, e.g. , Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 557 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (col
lecting cases).
205. If she does offer the diagnosis as evidence, most courts would likely require her to do so
through expert medical testimony, in which case there might be a waiver as a result of offering
such evidence. See, e.g., 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 551 (1996) . The practice guide explains:
While a nonexpert or lay witness may not give expert testimony as to his physical con
dition, he may state simple inferences drawn from his conscious subjective sensations
concerning such condition.... According to some authority, a witness should be con
fined to testimony or statements relating to the outward appearance of his injuries and
to the symptoms experienced by him, such as pain, suffering, and the like, and should
not be permitted to testify as to the nature of his injuries, the applicable medical termi
nology, and the like, and the medical prognosis or treatment. According to some cases,
a witness may not testify as to whether or not he had a particular disease or was treated
for a particular disease.
I d.
206. AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL oF MENTAL DISOR
DERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000) .
207. See i.d. at 1 (noting that the United States Health Care Finance Administration mandates
use of the DSM's codes " for purposes of reimbursement" and that many private insurers require
use of the codes as well). While not every person receiving psychotherapy is covered by insur
ance or a publicly funded program, it is likely to be a substantial percentage that, at one point or
another in treatment, has some degree of coverage, thus triggering the diagnosis requirement.
208. See, e.g. , i.d. at 683 ("Adjustment Disorders" are a group of conditions marked by "the
development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable stressor(s) oc
curring within three months of the onset of the stressor(s)"); id. at 604 ("Primary Insomnia" is a
disorder primarily characterized by a "difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or nonrestorative
sleep, for at least 1 month.").
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de termining whether there is a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.209
Similarly, some courts distinguish garde n-variety emotional distress
from other emotional distress based upon whether the plaintiff has
sought psychotherapy for the condition. As one magistrate judge ex
plained with respect to his understanding of non-garden-variety emo
tional distress, " Generally what we find in these cases is someone
sought psychotherapy." 210 Under this circular reasoning, a person
who has psychotherapy records, and therefore something to protect
with the psychotherapist-patient privilege, does not by definition have
garden-va riety emotional distress. Of course, there are several rea
sons why one does or does not seek therapy, which may have little to
do with the severity of the e motional distress.211 Indeed, once litiga
tion is inevitable, a plaintiff may decide to discontinue psychotherapy
for the very reason that her records would be subject to discovery,
only to find that the defendant can successfully argue tha t the alleged
emotional distress was minimal as demonstrated by the plaintiffs fail
ure to seek treatmentztz
3.

Applying Privacy, Fairness, and Relevance Rationales to Waiver
Questions

In Jaffee, the Supreme Court took to task the balancing approach
followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had established
only a conditional privilege, meaning that the application of the privi
lege would consider the defendant's need for the evidence.213 This
conceptualization is similar to that seen in the Connecticut statute
which requires courts to weigh the " interests of justice" implicated by
disclosure of privileged communications.214 Instead, the Supreme
Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege as an "abso
lute" privilege, which means that the opposing pa rty's need for the
evide nce would not bea r on whether a court would enforce the privi
lege. The absolute approach is not as inflexible as the name would
209. Edward l mwinkelried proposed a waiver distinction based upon whether the plaintiff is
merely asserting " transitory feelings . . . or sensations,» rather than a true "condition." IM.
WINKELRIED, SUpra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 882-83.
210. Orenstein, supra note 17, at 699. Magistrate Judge Orenstein went on to say that he
thought that the garden-variety distinction in mental health cases, as opposed to general medical
cases, was created to provide an additional layer of privacy for plaintiffs. Jd. at 702.
211. One study by the American Psychiatric Association suggested that the overwhelming
majority of individuals who experience anxiety and depression never seek treatment. Robinson,
supra note 37, at 70.
212. Jd. at 68.
213. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996).
214. See supra notes 8~9 and accompanying text.
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imply; t he Supreme Court expressly acknowledged t he possibility of
waiver and exceptions. Nonetheless , t he stated effect of creating an
absolute privilege is to wholly eliminate from t he analysis any consid
eratio n of competing interests of fairness, relevance, and t rut h-seek
ing. H owever, while no trial o r appeals court of course admits to a
rejection of the absolute approach set fo rth in Jaffee, such balancing in
fact pervades the pos t-Jaffee case law in the context of the question of
waiver.
The tension between absolute and conditional privileges stems in
large part from the broad scope of discovery unde r the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and fede ral courts ' general re luctance to limit the
disclosure of any potentially releva nt information. As one fe de ral
magistrate judge noted recently, " Contrary to t he common law 's ap
proach , contempo rary thought has concluded that secrecy is not con
genial to truth-seeking, and that trial by ambush is incompatible with
t he just determination of cases o n their merits. "215 Thus, t he magis
t rate judge continued, " As expansive as is t he definition of releva ncy
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, t he [relevancy] sta n
dard u nder Rule 26 [of t he Federal R ules of Civil Procedure] is even
broade r." 216 The burden of challe nging the scope of a discovery rule
falls entirely upon the party seeking to limit disclosure , and it is gener
ally a difficult burden to meet.217
Federal courts invoking notions of fairness and truth-seeking when
considering questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege employ analyses based upo n the scope of discovery permitted
under Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 26, an approach that is sepa
rate from, and independent of, privilege considera tions. The often
cited ruling in Sarko v. Penn -Del Directory Co. , an A DA case consid
ered soon aft er Jaffee , may have perpetuated the trend of weighing the
t ruth-seeking fu nctions of broad discovery in the face of the newly
established privilege.218 In fi nding a waiver by the plaintiff, the dis
t rict court judge noted, relying on pre-Jaffee case law, t hat federal and
state courts had long recognized waiver t hrough raising the issue of
o ne' s psychological state.219 The judge concluded that it would be
215. Hodgdon v. Nw. Univ., 245 F .R.D. 337, 341 (N.D. IU. 2007) .
216. Jd. (internal cit ations omitted). Rule 26 provides, in pertinent part: " Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." F ED. R. CJv. P. 26(b)(1) .
217. H odgdon, 245 F.R. D. at 341.
218. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R. D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997) .
219. Jd. at 130.
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" contrary to t he most basic sense of fairness and justice " to permit the
plaintiff to "hide [ ] behind a claim of privilege."22o
Several other courts adopted and expanded this approach. A Te n
nessee federal court, applying Tennessee law but relying upon fe de ral
law precede nt, including Sarka, found a waiver of the psychotherapist
pa tient privilege in a sexual harassment case because the plaintiff
sought emotional distress damages and therefore, " application of the
privilege would have denied t he opposing party access to information
vital to his defense. "221 A judge in the Northern District of Illinois
found a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and noted that
the plaintiffs psychotherapist's trea tment notes were "extremely pro
ba tive and ma terial to [the defendant's] defense."222 Another court
ta king the broad view of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege noted in its decision: " It is a well-established rule of law that dis
covery in discrimina tion cases should not be na rrowly circumscribed.
The scope of discovery is particula rly broad in discrimination
cases."223 Notably, however, all of the cases that the court cited for
support were cases permitting broad discovery of defendants' employ
ment practices and none involved claims of the psychotherapist-pa
tie nt privilege.224
By basing decisions rega rding whether or not there has been a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the importance of
the t ruth-seeking purposes of discovery and trial, these courts make
two critical e rrors. First, as noted above, a waiver is most properly
construed as an affirmative act of an individual through which known
rights are not asserted. The benefit flowing to another party from
such waiver of rights, or the corresponding burden imposed by the
assertion of the rights, has no place in the analysis. Although the con
cept of waiver requires courts to focus on a plaintiff's intentional ac
tions, courts often give weight to how such evidence would play into
and support defendants' theories to avoid liability or to lessen a dam
age award. Once courts employ this le ns to determine whether to find
a waiver, defendants almost invariably prevail.225 It is a rare case in
220. Jd.
221. Kirchner v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 129 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) .
222. Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi ., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,
1999).
223. Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *1 (D . Kan. Jan. 31, 2002)
(citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F .2d 333, 34~ (10th Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)).
224. Jd.
225. One notable exception is Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. IU. 1999), dis
cussed infra at notes 337- 343 and accompanying text and note 373.
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which the evidence would be both relevant and not subject to waiver,
especially given the countless ways that a defendant could use such
evide nce at trial.226
The second flaw in these courts' reasoning is that it overlooks the
fact that privileges necessa rily run counter to truth-seeking functions.
Privileges exist where courts or legislatures have determined, for pol
icy reasons , that such evide nce should be protected from disclosure,
notwithstanding its relevance.227 As Dr. Slawson observed in his 1969
criticism of the patient-litigant exception: "Truth like all other good
things may be loved unwisely- maybe pursued too keenly-may cost
too much."228 Thus, balancing privacy, facilitation of communications,
or other values associated with privileges against truth-seeking, fair
ness , and other aims of discovery occurs in the initial determination of
whether to recognize a privilege in the first place, not whether to infer
that a particular plaintiff has waived such privilege. With respect to
the psychothe rapist-patient privilege specifically, Jaffee answered the
balancing question by concluding, as a general matter, that "communi
cations between a psychothe rapist and her patient ' promote[ ] suffi
ciently important inte rests to outweigh the need for probative
evide nce. ' " 229
The Supre me Court of Colorado in Johnson v. Trujillo acknowl
edged the fundamental nature of a privilege when addressing the issue
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.230 The court noted
that the defendant's " most compelling argument" for why he needed
access to a personal-injury-claim plaintiff's psychiatric records was
that " the information sought may be relevant to a de termination of
the extent to which Johnson's mental suffering is properly attributable
to the accident as opposed to some othe r cause."231 H owever, the
court noted, " it is the very nature of evidentiary witness privileges to
' sacrifice some availability of evidence relevant to an administration
of justice.' "232 Accordingly, "'relevance alone cannot be the test
226. See supra notes 33- 37 and accompanying text.
227. KunstJer v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2006) (" [R)elevance alone cannot trigger a finding that a party has waived a privilege, and
most certainly not an absolute privilege.").
228. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352 (quoting Lord Justice Knight Bruce in JoHN FRELINGHUY
SEN HAGEMAN, PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATIONS AS A B RANCH OF LEGAL EvmENCE 10 (1889)).
229. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9- 10 (1996) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting uammel v. United States, 445 U .S. 40, 51 (1980)).
230. Johnson v. uujillo, 977 P .2d 152 (Colo. 1999).
231. Jd. at 157.
232. Jd. (emphasis added) (quoting CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK oN EvroENCE
§ 72, at 101 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)).
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'"233 The rationale for court-implied waivers of the privilege
arose, not out of a concern for the unfairness of excluding potentially
relevant evide nce, but rather the unfairness tha t may accompany a
plaintiff's use of the privilege as a "sword instead of a shield," by " pa
rading" a mental or physical condition while asserting the privilege at
the same time.234
As noted above, the nature of psychological harm and the broad
scope of discovery generally enable defenda nts seeking such records
to easily articulate the potential releva nce of a wide range of mental
health records. Relevance, like necessity, is an appropriate consider
ation unde r R ule 26, but it is not applicable to the question of
waiver.235 A magistra te judge fo r the District of Maine accura tely and
succinctly noted this important distinction: " [P]rivileges operate not
withsta nding relevancy and ... the proper subject for the waiver anal
ysis is whether the substance of a particular communication has been
placed in issue , not whether the topic of communica tion is releva nt to
the factual issues of the case."236
Nonetheless, many courts weigh the potential relevance of the psy
chotherapy discovery sought when determining whether to find
waiver of t he psychotherapist-patie nt privilege. The District Court's
rationale in Doe v. City of Chula Vista is typical:
[T]o insure a fair trial, pa rticula rly on the element of causation [of
emotional distress], ... defe ndants should have access to evidence
t hat Doe's emotional state was caused by something else. D efend
ants must be free to test the truth of Doe 's co ntention that she is
emotionally upset because of the defe ndants' conduct.237

In Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc. , a court similarly confused absolute
and conditional privileges.238 In t hat case, the plaintiffs alleged dis
crimination on the basis of race and national origin, and the defendant
sought the comple te file of the plaintiffs' psychotherapist. The court
recognized tha t the records may be subject to a psychotherapist-pa
tie nt privilege but, after briefly citing the conflicting case law regard
ing waiver, the court concluded: " It is clear t hat a balancing of the
interests must be done, the Defendant's interest in obtaining informa
233. Jd. (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994)).
234. Jd. (citing McCoRMICK, supra note 232, § 103, at 146).
235. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[S]tanding alone, the relevance of the
information [sought in discovery] is inadequate to support a finding of an iniplied waiver. ").
236. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug.
21, 2001); see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d . 117, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) ("'[P]arties .. . do not forfeit [a
privilege] merely by taking a position that the evidence might contradict."' (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 505 U .S. 317, 323 (1992) )).
237. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D . 562, 569 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
238. Sanchez v. U .S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E. D. Pa . 2001).
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tion directly relevant to the claims being made by Plaintiffs, and the
Plaintiffs' privacy interest in shielding personal and potentially irrele
vant information. "239 The district court concluded that precluding dis
closure of the records, " [t]hough convenie nt to Plaintiffs . . . is
unsatisfactory to our adversarial system of justice."240 Accordingly, it
held, " [I]t is clear that Defendant's interest in defending Plaintiffs'
claim must outweigh Plaintiffs' privacy interest in these records." 241
While notions of fairness to the parties and the importance of provid
ing fact finders competing evidence are central, important aims in our
system of adversary litigation, their consideration has no place in an
analysis of whether a plaintiff has waived a privilege if that privilege is
to be given any force.242
Sanchez is among those federal court decisions that not only incor
rectly weigh the relevance of the information sought to be discovered,
but also improperly frame the question as that of the extent of a plain
tiffs nebulous " privacy" interest, rather than a legally defined privi
lege.243 Setting up a comparison of " privacy" to the broad right to
discovery, these courts fail to acknowledge the critical distinction be
tween privacy, as that concept is generally applied in Rule 26,244 and
239. Id. at 135- 36.
240. Id. at 136.
241. Id.
242. Remarkably, several federal courts that seemingly employ a Rule 26 approach fail to
even consider the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See, e.g. , Moore v. Chertoff,
No. 00-953, 2006 WL 1442447, at *2-3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2006) (granting motion to compel dis
covery of plaintiffs' mental health records on basis of plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress,
without mention of psychotherapist-patient privilege); Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating,
Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL 1071736, at *18-19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004); Owens v. Sprint/
United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 659-60 (D . Kan. 2004); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A.
99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at *3 (D . Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Cleveland v. Int'l Paper Co., No.
%-CV-1068, 1997 WL 309408, at *2 (N.D.N .Y. June 5, 1997) (holding, without reference to the
privilege, that a defendant is entitled to discovery of medical and psychological records where a
sexual harassment plaintiff asserts a claim for even "ordinary" emotional distress).
243. Sanchez , 202 F.R.D. at 135- 36. Federal courts have not generally recognized a constitu
tionally-based right to privacy extending to communications in psychotherapy, although some
state courts have ruled that a limited constitutional right is implicated in such communications.
See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970); In re B, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa . 1978); see also
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976) (following the reasoning of Lif
schutz and finding any constitutional right to be only conditional, not absolute). See generally
Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Ralionales for the Confidentiality of Psychotherapist-Patient
Communications: Testimonial Privilege and the Constitution, 35 Hous. L. REv. 187, 210-14
(1998); Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1980).
244. See Seattle Tunes Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (noting that, although
Rule 26 "contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be
implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule. "). For
example, under Rule 26(c)(1) regarding protective orders: " (T]he court .. . may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
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the less flexible concept of privilege. For example, the U .S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that, by seeking a
claim for emotional distress in association with his A DA claim, a
plaintiff "may not maintain a claim of privacy in any me ntal he alth
records."245 The U.S. District Court fo r the District of Minnesota, in a
decision granting a defendant's motion to compel production of
me ntal he alth records, reasoned that, " [W]hile t he Court is mindful of
the privacy issues involved in the discovery of medical records, the
Court also favors the broad contours of discovery. "246 Thus, "where
[the] plaintiff put his e motional condition into issue ... he effectively
waives his right to privacy in any releva nt and unprivileged medical
records."247 Notions of privacy, like those of releva nce and fairness,
while laudable, simply have no place in determining whether a plain
tiff has taken affirmative steps tha t a court should regard as a knowing
and de liberate waiver of a legally held right.
Notably, the Supreme Court's rationale for the psychotherapist-pa
tie nt privilege was not one of privacy, but of the broade r societal in
terest in e ncouraging psychotherapy and, presumably, ca ndor during
treatment. U nder this ra tionale, when the privilege is given limited
effect, the adverse impact is on society, not the individual 's privacy
interests. For this reason, Jaffee held tha t a balancing inquiry would
" eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. "248 In other words, be
cause a broader concern fo r social welfa re is implicated through rec
ognition of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, considera tion of
fairness to individual litigants is beyond the authority of the courts.
Ironically, the instrumental rationale's role as an underpinning of
the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege may contribute to courts ' mis
placed application of the concept of waiver.249 Individual judges may
share t he skepticism towards the ra tionale expressed in Justice Scalia's
dissent, in which the Justice quipped: "[H]ow come psychotherapy
or undue burden or expense . ..." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c) . This can include unnecessary invasions
of a litigant's privacy. See a/so 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL , FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND
PRoCEDURE§ 2036, at 487 (2d. ed. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York has noted that " balanc[ing] [a plaintiffs] right to privacy with [a] defendant['s] ...
need for the information . .. invokes the principles of Federal Rule 26(c)(4)." Duck v. Port
Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008).
245. Manessis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Tr ansp., No. 02 CIV. 359SADF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2
(S.D.N. Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
246. Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ. 00-2604, 2002 WL 3253%35, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct.
28, 2002).
247. Jd.
248. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).
249. See IMWJNKELRJED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 842 ("Waivability flows from the instru
mental rationale. ").

2008]

PS Y CH OTHE RAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

121

got to be a thriving practice before the ' psychotherapis t privilege' was
invented ?" 250 In the absence of recognition of rationales such as pro
tecting p rivacy and autonomy and e ncouraging individuals to enforce
t heir federally protected rights, courts fail to appreciate how they u n
dermine t he privilege by summarily finding waivers.z5t
Cases such as Doe v. City of Chula Vista252 that emphasize the im
portance of " test(ing] the t ru th" of emotional distress claims suggest
another possible explanation for courts' extreme reluctance to shield
mental health records from discovery: the essentially unqu antifiable
extent of emotional distress and the imprecise nature of e motions and
mental fu nctioning and their causes.253 The current civil justice sys
tem gra nts wide latitude to fact finde rs to p lace moneta ry value on
nonpecuniary damages, which can sometimes resu lt in seemingly la rge
verdicts. Public perception and political arguments that t here are too
few outer limits to t he values t hat jurors can assign to such damages
have lead to tort reform legislation,Z54 as well as damages caps unde r
t he Civil Rights Act of 1991.255 Under t his view, limiting defendants '
access to potentially relevant discovery on this form of d amages may
appear to simply provide yet another advantage to plaintiffs seeking
oversized verdicts.

4.

Scope of the Waiver and Alternative Sources of Emotional
Distress

D e termining whether a part y has waived t he psychotherapist-pa
tie nt privilege d oes not necessarily resolve p recisely what the party
has waived. Thus , judges often grapple with an additional layer of
controversy regarding which records fall within t he scope of the
waiver. One significa nt area of discovery sparring is whether a plain
tiff who is fou nd to have waived the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege
250. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 24 (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
251. See SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 136-37 (arguing that basing the psychothera
pist-patient privilege on a deontological, rather than instrumental, rationale enables courts to
take a " different [and superior) approach to the structure of the privilege and its exceptions») .
252. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F. R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal 1999).
253. See ABELE, supra note 40, at 8 (suggesting that there is a long-standing judicial suspicion
of emotional distress claims).
254. WrLLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL Mc CANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: PoLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 96 (2004) (noting that awards for nonpecuniary damages are a particular
target of tort reform advocates because such awards are regarded by many as " arbitrary"); Steve
Lohr, Bush's Next Target: Malpractice Lawyers, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 3, at 1 (noting that
one feature of " tort reform " proposals is caps on "non-economic damages," including those for
emotional distress).
255. Steven A. Holmes, Costs, Not Quotas, Worry Some Foes of Rights Bill, N.Y. T IMES, May
27, 1990, § 4, at 4 (discussing the drive to impose damage caps in Civil Rights Act of 1991) .
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must disclose mental health treatme nt received prior to the incident at
issue in the litiga tion. Generally, once a court concludes that the re
has been an implied waiver of the psychothera pist-patie nt privilege, it
grants defendants broad access , not only to records of trea tment for
the emotional distress for which recovery is sought, but also to any
and all mental health records including those from yea rs prior to the
incident at issue in the litiga tion. In so doing, it skips two critical steps
in a proper analysis: it fails to consider whether such discovery falls
within the Rule 26 concept of relevance, and it fails to link the scope
of the waiver to the purported affirmative conduct on the part of the
plaintiff giving rise to the waiver.
While the relevance of records sought in discovery is not a proper
consideration for determining whether there has been a waiver of any
privilege with respect to such records, a court may always limit discov
ery of information tha t is not " reasonably calcula ted to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." 256 Because recovery of damages in
civil rights claims , including those brought pursuant to § 1983 or any
of the federal nondiscrimination statutes, is a remedy that essentially
sounds in tort,257 parties and judges look to tort law principles to de
termine the relevance of evidence in support of or limiting damages
claims. A plaintiff is entitled to full compensa tion fo r all injuries prox
imately caused by the defendant's acts even if the injuries were "ag
gravated by reason of a preexisting physical or mental condition." 258
Accordingly, a defendant may not use a plaintiff's preexisting condi
tion , such as a particular emotional vulnerability, as a vehicle to es
cape liability fo r emotional distress damages. This is reflected by the
" eggshell skull" rule tha t a " defenda nt takes the plaintiff as it finds
him or her." 259 The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on compensatory
256. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
257. See GEORGE R uTHERGLEN, MAJoR Issu ES IN THE FEDERAL LAw oF EMPLOYMENT D1s.
CRIMINATION 1 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that employment discrimination case law has " relied in
creasingly on damages as a remedy for employment discrimination and therefore on tort
principles to determine liability"). See also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U .S. 299,
305 (1986) (" We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates 'a species of tort liability'
... ."); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U .S. 189, 195 (1974) (noting that a damages claim brought pursu
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "sounds basically in tort- the statute merely defines a new legal duty,
and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's
wrongful breach") . The same analysis applies to damages claims sought under other civil rights
statutes. See DoBBS, supra note 24, at 81-82 (" Civil rights violations are torts. They have gener
ated an important specialty, in which the courts look to common law tort rules as models without
necessarily accepting their limitations. ").
258. 22 AM. J u R. 2d Damages § 239 (2003).
259. Id. See also Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that, under Texas
law: " [T]ortfeasors take their victims as they find them, even when the claimed harm is mental
anguish or emotional distress. A victim 's particular susceptibility wiU not reduce the damages
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damages also indicates that a defendant will be liable for e motional
distress damages of a plaintiff who was previously " emotionally sensi
tive."260 This rule suggests that a defendant may not offer evide nce of
a plaintiffs preexisting mental condition as a means to avoid liability
for emotional distress that results from the defendant's actions.
What is less clear, however, is whether a defendant may assert that
it should not be held liable fo r the full amount of the plaintiff's emo
tional distress damages, due to an underlying mental disorder or alter
native sources of emotional distress. A defendant is liable for any
harm, including emotional distress, so long as her " conduct is a sub
stantial factor in bringing about the harm. "261 As a general principle,
a defendant may seek apportionment of damages among other causes,
but only where it makes a showing that "there is a reasonable basis fo r
de termining the contribution of each cause to a single harm."262 Oth
erwise, the harm is deemed to be "indivisible " and not subject to
apportionmenf.263
available."); Miley v. Landry, 582 So. 2d 833, 837 (La. 1991) ("When a defendant's negligent
conduct aggravates a pre-existing condition, the victim must be compensated for the full extent
of the aggravation. " (internal citations omitted)); DoBBS, supra note 24, at 851-52 (explaining
that thin skull rules apply to claims for emotional harm, except in cases where a person would
not be expected to suffer any emotional harm at all and hence the plaintiff's reaction to the
event was wholly unforeseeable).
260. Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available under § 102 of
the Civil Rights A ct of 1991 , 2 EMPL . PRAC. GumE (CCH) 'II 5360, July 14, 1992, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html (hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] ("The fact
that the complaining party may be unusually emotionally sensitive and incur great emotional
harm from discriminatory conduct will not absolve the respondent from responsibility for the
greater emotional harm.").
261. RESTATEMEI'rr (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 431 cmt. a (1965) ("The word 'substantial' is used
to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause . .. .").The same analysis applies to the torts of
negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which are sometimes included in com
plaints alleging discrimination or violation of civil rights. The defendant's wrongful actions need
not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress, but must be a "substantial cause. " See
Ferguson v. United States Army, 938 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 260.
262. RESTATEMEI'rr (SECOND) OF T oRTS § 433A (1965). The rules set forth in section 433A
apply not only to instances where there may be more than one tortfeasor, but also
where one or more of the contributing causes is an innocent one, as where the negli
gence of a defendant combines with the innocent conduct of another person, or with
the operation of a force of nature, or with a pre-existing condition which the defendant
has not caused, to bring about the harm to the plaintiff.
ld. cmt. a.
263. ld. cmt. i ("Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any
logical, reasonable, or practical division. "). See also Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091,
1093 (Me. 1995) ("The single injury rule places any hardship resulting from the difficulty of
apportionment on the proven wrongdoer and not on the innocent plaintiff."); DoBBS, supra note
24, at 425.
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The Court of Appeals for the E ighth Circuit applied these princi
ples to questions of discovery and burden shifting in a sexual harass
ment class action case where the defenda nts had adva nced an
alterna tive source of e motional distress damages argument. In Jenson
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., female e mployees of a large mining company
brought a class action lawsuit under Title VII seeking remedies for
widespread and systematic sexual harassment.264 The Special Master
appointed by the district court permitted broad discovery of the plain
tiffs ' personal backgrounds including "detailed medical histories,
childhood experiences, domestic abuse, abortions, and sexual relation
ships."265 Although the Special Master initially reasoned that such
discovery was proper because it was the defenda nts' burden to show
that events other than the alleged harassment proximately caused the
plaintiffs' emotional distress, at the time of trial he re-assigned plain
tiffs the burden of disproving alterna tive causes of their distress.266
Reversing on appeal, the Eighth Circuit criticized both the denial of
the plaintiffs' requests for protective orders against such invasive dis
covery267 and the reassignment of the burde n of proof on causation.2 68
Citing a string of cases from other courts and legal contexts, the panel
noted that a "tortfeasor is liable for all of [the] natural and proximate
consequences" of its actions,269 which " include[d] damages assessed
. . . for harm caused to a plaintiff who happens to have a fragile
psyche."270 Because the Special Master in Jenson had concluded that
the plaintiffs' emotional harm was indivisible, the defendants were
foreclosed from seeking apportionment, rendering the plaintiffs' prior
psychological and medical histories irrelevant.271
264. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). The claims were filed prior
to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but the plaintiffs were able to seek emo
tional distress damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Jd. at 1290.
265. Jd. at 1292.
266. Jd. at 1293.
267. Jd. at 1292-93.
268. Jd. at 1294.
269. Jd.
270. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1295. The plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden largely because
the Special Master also precluded them from offering any expert testimony in support of their
emotional distress claims on the basis that none of the proffered experts had "advanced a vali
dated theory" for allocating "causal effect of multiple psychological stresses or trauma." /d. at
1297. This ruling was also reversed on appeal. /d. at 1298.
271. Jd. at 1294. However, a comment to section 433 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
T oRTS, titled Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is Substantial
Factor in Producing Harm, suggests that a fact finder may consider whether "[s]ome other event
which is a contributing factor in producing the harm may have such a predominant effect in
bringing it about as to make the effect of the actor's negligence insignificant and, therefore, to
prevent it from being a substantial factor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T oRTS § 433 cmt. d
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Following Jenson, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri in R obinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc. precluded de
fendants from seeking discovery regarding whether the plaintiff in the
sexual harassment claim had any extramarital affairs at the time of the
alleged harassment.272 While the case did not involve the discovery of
me ntal health records, the analysis applies with equal force in cases in
which a defendant bases a discovery request for such records on the
rationale that it is exploring potential alternative causes of e motional
distress. The judge in Robinson noted that the defendants there had
suggested " no way in which they can satisfy their obligation to segre
gate the ' harassment-induced stress ' from the 'extramarital affair-in
duced stress ,'" and therefore would have no basis to make such
argument to the jury at trial.273 The significance of the ruling was not
lost on the judge, as she noted: "The Court concedes that it may be
impossible for any defendant to satisfy this burden because psycholog
ical conside rations are not subject to such nice categorizations; none
theless, the rule is clearly established in Jenson."v4 Accordingly,
" [d]efendants ca nnot simply present evidence of alleged stressors and
leave it to the jury to determine whether, and to what extent, the emo
tional damage attributable to Plaintiffs various stress factors is
divisible. " 275
Indeed, it is fair to question whether e motional distress damages
and other psychological injuries can ever meet the requirements for a
" divisible" harm that could be subject to apportionment. Determin
ing and quantifying causa tion of psychological distress is not an exer
cise that contemporary psychotherapists generally undertake. The
(1965). This would suggest that some alternative causes of harm, including emotional distress,
may be the proper subject of trial evidence (and by extension discovery).
272. Robinson v. Canon U .S.A., Inc., 82 FEP Cases 1129 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2000) . A sepa
rate , additional basis of the court's ruling was Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which limits the
admissibility of evidence of a civil plaintiffs sexual history. Jd.
273. Jd. at 1130.
274. Jd.
275. Jd. Further, there are indications that evidence of prior mental health treatment can be
effective in lowering defendants' exposure. Courts, and presumably juries, have decreased dam
age awards in civil rights cases based upon evidence of alternative and preexisting causes of
emotional distress. For example, in a sexual harassment case, Hurley v. Atlantic City Police De
partment, 933 F. Supp. 396 (D .N.J. 1996), the court granted the defendant's motion for remitti
tur, reducing the jury's award of $575,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress to
$175,000. The court based its decision in part upon the opinion of the defendant's expert psychi
atric witness that " the difficulties plaintiff has faced and continues to face are rooted in sources
other than workplace harassment, such as a troubled childhood marked by sexual molestation,
abandonment, and foster homes; physical abuse by both of her husbands; and other severe per
sonal, marital and family problems unrelated to her work environment. " Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at
424.
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has little to say
about the causes of such disorde rs.276 As o ne pair of defense-oriented
forensic examiners asserted:
[I]n the contemporary biopsychosocial medical model of diagnosis,
t he " causation" of mental events is explained from the perspective
of multiple interactions between biology , psychology and t he social
milieu. From the biopsychosocial perspective , all of the poten tially
interacting causes (preexisting, concurren t, and subsequen t) t hat
may explain a particular mental injury must be investigated in order
to arrive at a comprehensive and valid understanding of the alleged
mental damages. 277

The authors argue tha t this comprehensive approach to causation jus
tifies " a thorough and careful investiga tion of a plaintiff's life course
and developmental history prior to, during, and after the allegedly in
jurious event."278 But the complexity of determining causation cannot
alone provide the ra tionale for compelling discovery of a plaintiff's
lifetime of mental health records absent a clea r legal vehicle to ad
vance such argume nts.
Nonetheless, courts generally permit defenda nts to discover histori
cal mental health records upon a finding of waiver, and they offer lit
tle scrutiny of the releva nce of such records. Apparently, no court
considering the issue of waiver of the psychotherapis t-pa tient privi
lege has followed the reasoning of Jenson or Robinson or broader tort
principles of apportionment of harm. In Rose v. Vermont Mutual In
surance Co. , the court permitted extensive discovery of a plaintiff's
mental health history as a result of her claim fo r emotional distress
da mages , which is typical of courts' bare mention of the scope of dis
covery in cases where a defendant seeks a plaintiff's mental health
records.279 Once the plaintiff was found to have waived t he psycho
therapist-patie nt privilege, the court concluded that such waiver "'ap
276. Druk:teinis, supra note 19 (" In general, DSM-JV-TR does not focus on the etiology of
psychiatric diagnosis and, by extension, causation."). The notable exception is the diagnostic
criteria for Post-Tr aumatic Stress Disorder, which includes: "[Ilhe person experienced, wit
nessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or
serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others." AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N,
supra note 206, at 4{,7.
277. Mark I. Levy & Saul E. Rosenberg, The " Eggshell Plaintiff' Revisited: Causation of
Mental Damages in Ci vil Litigat ion, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 205
(2003).
278. Jd.
279. Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL 3333394 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (d.i
versity case in which the court purported to follow Vermont law on the scope of the psychothera
pist-patient privilege) . The court also concluded that the fact that the plaintiffs depression had
an onset prior to the accident took it out of the possible " garden-variety" protection afforded to
some emotional d.istress claims. Jd. at *2.
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plie(d] to the discovery of matters causally or historically related to
the patient-plaintiff's health put in issue by the injuries and damages
claimed in the action.' " 280
Similarly, in EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Soci
ety , the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment and gender discrimina
tion.281 The court denied the plaintiff's request to limit discovery of
her mental health records to the health care providers she saw during
or after her period of employment with the defendant and to further
limit the information to that " associated with [the plaintiff's] employ
me nt.''282 The trial court reasoned that "information in the records
may shed light on other contributing causes of [the plaintiff's] claims
of e motional distress.'' 283
In addition to addressing these questions of relevance before a
plaintiff's lifetime of mental health tre atment can be subject to discov
ery, a court must also make a specific finding that the plaintiff waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to the communica
tions with each treatment provider, a step notably absent from federal
courts' analysis of waiver. Thus, merely sta ting a claim for e motional
distress arising from an incidence of discrimination in 2005, for exa m
ple, cannot serve as a basis for seeking psychotherapy records from
the yea r 2001. Rather, a court must identify an affirmative act by the
plaintiff consistent with a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege as to those communica tions from 2001 as well. In a case where
the plaintiff releases the e arlier records to a current psychotherapist
or a forensic examiner who will offer an expert opinion based in part
upon such records , a court may properly find an express or implied
waiver with respect to those records. In the absence of evide nce of an
action by a plaintiff effectuating such a waiver, the records cannot be

280. Jd. (quoting Mattison v. Poulen, 353 A.2d 327, 330 (Vt. 1976)).
281. EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No. 8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *3
(D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007).
282. Jd.
283. Jd. See also Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL
1071736, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (permitting discovery of plaintiffs psychotherapy
records for a period back to two years prior to the commencement of her employment with
defendants); Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 31,
2002) (permitting discovery of plaintiff's psychotherapy records for a period back to three years
prior to when the discriminatory conduct was alleged to have occurred); McKenna v. Cruz, No.
98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (permitting discovery of plain
tiffs psychotherapy records for the five-year period prior to the incident at issue in plaintiffs
excessive force claim) .
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subject to discovery, rega rdless of the defenda nt's theory of
relevance.284
5.

Compelled Psychological Exams Under Rule 35

In several cases, a discovery request for the release of psychother
apy records is paired with a dema nd for a psychological or psychiatric
evaluation under R ule 35 of the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure.285
Courts sometimes couple and often confuse t he analysis of waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and Rule 35 psychological exa m
ina tions.286 Such confusion is not entirely surprising. In the years
before federal courts analyzed whether a plaintiff could be compelled
to turn over records and other information regarding her mental
health under a t heory of implied waiver, courts considered whether
she could be compelled to submit to a psychological examination by
placing her mental condition "in controversy. "287 While the two ques
tions appea r similar, t he distinctions are critical to the proper applica
tion of waiver of a privilege.
Rule 35, in a somewhat different fo rm from its current language,
was among the original civil procedure rules promulga ted by the
U nited States Supreme Court in 1938.288 It was met with controversy
because Rule 35 reversed, through court rule rather than statute, the
well-settled rule in fede ral courts prohibiting compelled physical ex
284. See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that, while the
psychotherapist-patient privilege may limit a defendant's access to certain records, a defendant
has other means, such as cross-examination, to challenge a plaintiffs emotional distress claims).
285. Rule 35 provides, in pertinent part: "(T)he court in which the action is pending may
order [a] party [whose mental or physical condition is in controversy) to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner." F ED. R. C.v. P. 35(a) . See also
Gaines-Hanna v. Farmington Pub. Sch., No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 WL 932074, at *10 (E .D.
Mich. Apr. 7, 2006); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assoc., II, P.C., No. Civ. A. 03-2034,
2004 WL 1813232, at *3 (E. D. Pa. July 21, 2004); Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D.
551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at
*4 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Colo. 1998). In Young,
the court did not expressly find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but the court
did grant the defendants' motion to compel production of documents and answers to interroga
tories pertaining to the plaintiff's mental health history based, with no analysis, upon the same
rationale ("plaintiff has placed her mental state at issue") applied to its decision to grant the
defendant's motion to take a Rule 35 psychiatric examination of the plaintiff. Young, 2004 WL
1813232, at *3-4.
286. In Gaines-Hanna, the trial court applied the post-Jaffee case Jaw of implied waiver to
determine whether the defendants were entitled to subject the plaintiff to a Rule 35 psychiatric
examination, and based upon that analysis, further concluded that the defendants were entitled
to receive records documenting the plaintiffs psychiatric treatment during the prior twelve
years. Gaines-Hanna, 2006 WL 932074, at *8, 11- 12.
287. FED. R. C1v. P. 35(a).
288. SA WRIGHT ET A L , supra note 244, § 2231.
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amination of litigants.289 One of the ea rliest challe nges came in Sib
bach v. Wilson & Co. , in which the Supreme Court upheld the new
rule as a valid exercise of the Court's power to promulgate procedural
rules pursuant to the 1934 Rules Enabling Act.290 Joined by three
Justices , Justice Frankfurter vigorously argued in dissent that the
Court did not have the power to effect such a "drastic change in public
policy," which affected the " inviolability of a person."291
In 1964, a divided Supreme Court construed Rule 35 in Schlagen
hauf v. Holder, a case that conside red the applicability of the rule to a
compelled examination of a defendant.292 The Court specifically re
jected the argument that Sibbach had been decided on the grounds
that a plaintiff, by bringing an action for damages, had somehow
waived his privacy interests. 293 Indeed, Justice Goldberg, writing for
the majority, seemed to reject a waiver rationale, noting that it would
mean that " a plaintiff has waived a right by exercising his right of
access to the federal courts," and that " [s]uch a result might create
constitutional problems." 294 Rather, the basis for compelling exami
nations of either plaintiffs or defendants was nothing more than the
plain language of Rule 35, which was within the Court's authority to
promulgate.295
Although the Court upheld Rule 35, it also provided guidelines to
the lower courts regarding the application of the rule. It emphasized
that the rule " requires discriminating application by the trial judge,
who must decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the party
requesting a mental or physical examination or examinations has ade
quately demonstrated the existence of the Rule's requirements of ' in
controversy' and 'good cause.' " 296 As an example of a fairly straight
forward determination of these issues, the Court noted: "A plaintiff
in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury places that
mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the de
fendant with good cause for an examination to determine the exis
289. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U .S. 1, 16-17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting) (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1891)).
290. Sibbach, 312 U .S. at 16 (majority opinion) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072, formerly § 723b).
291. Jd. at 17- 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
292. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
293. Jd. at 113- 14.
294. Jd. at 114. The comments on waiver were prompted by Justice Douglas's dissent, in
which he argued that a defendant cannot be considered to have waived the "inviolability of the
person" because he has been " dragged" to court. Jd. at 126 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). By con
trast, a plaintiff may " choose between his privacy and his purse." I d.
295. Jd. at 114 (majority opinion) .
296. Jd. at 118-19.
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tence and extent of such asserted injury." 297 By contrast, the
defendant in that case had not " affirmatively put into issue his own
mental or physical condition" through any sort of claim or defense of
his own. 298
In case law that parallels and sometimes intersects that regarding
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, many courts have held
that Rule 35 psychiatric exa minations are not warranted solely on the
basis of a claim for emotional distress damages,Z99 or with respect to
liability in sexual harassment claims.300 G enerally, courts d o not orde r
such examinations absent allegations of ongoing emotional distress. 301
For example, in Fox v. Gates Corp. , the court attempted to summarize
the guidelines that had developed for determining when a court may
order a Rule 35 mental health exa mination and concluded that there
were five pertinent factors, one or more of which must be present:
(1) plaintiff has asserted a specific cause of action for intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) plaintiff has alleged a
specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; (3) plai ntiff has
claimed unusually severe emotional distress; (4) plaintiff has offered
expert testimony in support of her claim for emotional distress dam
ages; and (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental condition is "in con
troversy" within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a).302
R elying on case law involving waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the court noted that claims for mere "garden-variety" emo
tional distress were not sufficient to trigger the Rule 35 factors. 303
H owever, in the sa me opinion the court concluded that the plaintiff
had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to dis

2fJ7. I d. at 119 (internation citations omitted).
298. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121.
299. See Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Colo. 1998) ("A minority of courts have
held that a plaintiff puts her mental condition 'in controversy' by simply making a claim for
emotional distress damages as part of an employment discrimination claim.»); Jennifer Wriggins,
Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation,
77 B.U. L. REv. 1025, 1072 n.234 (19fJ7).
300. See Margaret Bu11 Kovera & Stacie A. Cass, Compelled Mental Health Examinal ions,
Liability Decisions, and Damage Awards in Sexual Harassment Cases: Issues for Jury Research, 8
PsvcHoL. Pu n. PoL'Y & L. 96, 98 (2002) .
301. Id. ; see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (hold
ing that, because the plaintiffs' claims were for " past, not present" emotional distress, there was
no basis to order a Rule 35 psychological examination).
302. Fox , 179 F.R.D. at 307.
303. Jd. (citing Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126
F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989) ).
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closure of her psychotherapy records as a result of her emotional dis
tress damage claim.304
As the majority noted in Schlagenhauf, Rule 35 provides fede ral
courts the authority to de termine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to
compel a litigant to submit to a particular form of pretrial discov
ery.305 It does not provide authority to compel a waiver of a recog
nized right. However, courts have ignored this important distinction
and instead based their decisions on their own perception of the rela
tive intrusiveness of a mental examination versus the compelled dis
closure of mental health treatment records. Specifically, some courts
erroneously conclude that a Rule 35 examination is necessarily more
intrusive and, therefore, courts can be less circumspect about the re
lease of psychothe rapy records.306
Rule 35 examinations are unquestionably intrusive and can be quite
distressing, particularly where an inordinate focus is given to abuse,
trauma, and sexual and gynecological history in sexual harassme nt
cases.307 However, such examinations do not implicate the psycho
therapist-patie nt privilege unless disclosure of prior treatme nt records
is included in the order compelling examination.308 While an exam
ine r might request past psychotherapy records or ask the plaintiff
some questions about past treatme nt, de tailed disclosure of prior psy
chiatric treatment is not a necessar y component of the exam. Rather,
the examination is a one-time evaluation during litigation in which no
privileged communications ar e made. There is little risk that the Rule
35 exam will result in the revelation of deep secrets and vulnerabili
ties, such as might be revealed during a psychotherapy session outside
of the context of litigation, because the plaintiff knows that the results
of the exam and all statements made during the course of it will be
revealed to the opposing party.309 Indeed, in Vasconcellos v. Cybex
304. Jd. at 306. The court did impose some limitations on the time frame on records that
would be subject to disclosure and, in deed, it was not clear from the ruling whether there were in
fact any records that would be disclosed as a result.
305. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U .S. 104 (1964).
306. See, e.g. , Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 623 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The inva
sion of privacy occasioned by allowing opposing counsel to obtain copies of a plaintiff's psycho
logical records, where there is a claim of ordinary mental distress, is exceedingly less
burdensome than a Rule 35(a) examination. ").
307. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, A New Framework for Sexual Harassment Cases, T RIAL, Mar.
2003, at 36, 38; Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272.
308. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 99.
309. See EE OC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (" [I]f anything, delving
into a plaintiffs medical or psychological records is even more invasive than conducting a medi
cal or psychological examination . . .."); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 632 (S.D .
Cal. 1999) ("Many, if not most, people would undoubtedly prefer to submit to a mental examina
tion, in which they have a d egree of control over what information is revealed, than to have the
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International, Inc. , the plaintiff volunteered to unde rgo a psychia tric
examination in support of her motion to quash defendant's subpoena
of her treating psychotherapist' s records.310
Thus, intrusiveness is not the proper lens through which the two
discovery issues should be addressed; ra ther, courts should look to the
na ture of the rights at stake. The Supreme Court has recognized the
psychotherapist-patie nt privilege as a right held by all individuals,
which must be respected and enforced in the absence of a finding of
waiver. Accordingly, the analysis e mployed unde r a discovery rule
has no application.
6.

The Special Problem of ADA Cases

The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege in the
context of ADA cases presents a special problem. Several courts have
been quick to conclude that asserting a claim under the ADA effectu
ates a waiver of t he psychotherapist-pa tient privilege, either because
the plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages or simply because she
alleges that she is disabled due to a psychiatric condition. Some courts
have made remarkably broad proclamations of this conclusion while
being particularly dismissive of plaintiffs' assertions of the psychother
apist-patient privilege.
One of the leading cases articulating the broad view of waiver,
Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,311 is an ADA case decided the yea r
after Jaffee. The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated from her
employment after she disclosed to her e mployer that she required
medica tion to treat depression and sought an accommodation.312 The
court noted, based la rgely on Third Circuit and Pennsylva nia state
court precede nt, that a party waives the psychotherapist-patient privi
lege by " placing her mental condition at issue. "3 13 The court easily
found that the plaintiff had placed her mental condition in issue and
records of their past psychotherapy sessions disclosed to their adversaries in litigation.»). The
Supreme Court of Colorado similarly noted:
We can imagine many circumstances in which the compelled disclosure of sensitive and
private medical and counseling records is as offensive or more offensive to a litigant's
privacy, health, and dignity interests as a court-ordered mental examination would be.
Moreover, unlike a court-ordered mental examination, court-ordered disclosure of con
fidential records related to mental health treatment undercuts the additional, public
interest furthered by the privileges of encouraging citizens to seek help for their emo
tional problems.
Johnson v. 11-ujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999).
310. Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D. Md. 1997).
311. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R. D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
312. Jd. at 129.
313. Jd. at 130.
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therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege by asserting
that she was a qualified individual with a disability "by virtue of suf
fering from clinical depression."314 Accordingly, the court ordered
her to release " all records that contain[ed] confid ential communica
tions with her psychiatrist that [were] relevant to her mental condition
during the time she was in Defendant's employ."3t5
One of the starkest statements of waiver in the ADA context was
made by a judge in Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc. 3 16 The court
considered the issue of waiver in a case in which the plaintiff brought
a claim under the ADA alleging that the defendant failed to reasona
bly accommodate her Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and "severe de
pression."317 The court ordered the plaintiff to comply with all
outstanding requests for discovery-including those seeking her medi
cal records-and to " make all of her experts available for deposi
tion."318 The court reasoned: "In an action under the ADA, a
plaintiff's medical history is relevant in its entirety." 319 The court
made no reference to the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privi
lege or whether a finding of implied waiver was appropriate, and in
stead expressed surprise that the plaintiff resisted releasing her
records. 320 Although the court acknowledged that " [e]lements of a
claim under the ADA touch upon the most private and intimate de
tails of a plaintiff's life," the court stated broadly: "ADA plaintiffs,
like plaintiffs in an action for medical malpractice, waive all privileges
and privacy inte rests related to their claim by virtue of filing the com
plaint. "321 Several other cases have followed a simila r approach, hold
ing that the assertion of an ADA claim is sufficient in itself to waive
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.322
314. Jd.
315. Jd. The court also ordered the plaintiff to submit to a mental examination pursuant to
Rule 35. Jd. at 131.
316. Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N .C. 1996) .
317. Jd. at 91.
318. I d. at 92. It is not clear from the decision whether any treating psychotherapists had been
designated by the plaintiff as testifying experts.
319. Jd.
320. The court noted,"Although the action is based on the ADA, plaintiff has resisted disclos
ing her medical records. " Jd. at 91.
321. Jd. at 92.
322. Calder v. T CI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. July 21, 2001); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL 910443, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999); Patterson v. Chi. Ass'n for Retarded Children, No. 96 C 4713, 1997 WL
323575, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997); lwanejko v. Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., No. 2:03CV1855, 2005
WL 4043954, at *1 (W.O. Pa . Oct. 5, 1995).
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These cases reveal misplaced assumptions about the relevancy and
significa nce of such evidence. With respect to establishing disability
as opposed to emotional distress damages- the court will not ask the
jury to quantify precisely the extent of a plaintiffs mental condition,
and questions of causation have no role whatsoever in an ADA analy
sis.323 Rather, the definition of disability is a threshold inquiry regard
ing the application of the statute. Similarly, analogies to medical
malpractice cases, such as that found in the Butler case, are improper.
In those cases, the medical care by the defendant is the central issue
and filing such a claim is deemed to be a waiver of otherwise privi
leged communications with the defendant. In an ADA case , the evi
de nce and the fact finder should focus on whether there was unlawful
discrimination based upon the plaintiffs disability. As commenta tors
have observed, however, federal courts are too preoccupied with the
definition of disability; therefore, it is not surprising tha t they would
use the necessity of proof as a basis to find a broad waiver of the
privilege.324

v.

BRINGING CERTAINTY TO THE QUESTION OF WAIVER

Clearly, the current framing of the question of waiver of the psycho
therapist-patient privilege is unworkable, as courts themselves note
the sharp differences among their approaches.325 This uncertainty
renders the privilege nearly illusory, and by so doing, undermines an
alternative instrumental rationale for the existence of the privilege:
the privilege e nables those who have sought mental health treatment
to bring civil rights claims in federal court without concern that their
treatment will necessarily become a central focus of discovery, and
perhaps trial, over their objections. In order to serve this rationale,
federal courts should approach questions of waiver of the psychother
apist-patient privilege in a manner that is consistent with the general
323. Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA
Definition of Disability, 82 T u L. L. REv. 1, 64, 69- 70 (2007) (contrasting jury assessments of tort
damages and determinations of whether an ADA plaintiff meets the statute's definition of
disability) .
324. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 92 (2000). One wonders whether courts would be so quick to conclude that there is a waiver
of the clergy-believer privilege in every claim based upon religious discrimination. Indeed, I
have not found a single case in which this issue was even raised.
325. See, e.g. , Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008) ("The law on waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege is not set
tled."); Samaan v. Sauer, No. Civ-S-07-0960, 2008 WL 214680, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2008)
("Lower courts disagree on the test to determine whether the privilege is waived.") .
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concepts of waiver in the law and that provides all litigants meaningful
protection from unnecessary intrusion into their mental health history.
A.

An Alternative Instrumental Rationale

Individuals who have sought mental health treatment hold an un
certain privilege against disclosure of their psychotherapy records and
therefore face a difficult dilemma when considering whether to pursue
a civil claim in federal court. They must conside r whethe r they are
willing to run the risk of opening the door to detailed information
about their mental health treatment by alleging emotional injury re
sulting from a deprivation of civil rights or other wrongdoing, or by
alleging discrimination on the basis of mental illness. Undoubtedly,
for some, the answer may simply be that the risk is too great. Thus, on
the question of waiver , courts must shift their focus from an instru
mental rationale based upon the questionable assumption tha t the
psychotherapist-patient privilege e nsures that individuals seek psycho
therapy in the first place, to a more realistic and pertinent instrumen
tal rationale, namely, that of ensuring that those who have or had a
mental illness and received treatment are not broadly discouraged
from using the courts to remedy a deprivation of their rights. 326
Professor Anita Hill, whose mental health was the subject of scru
tiny during the confirmation hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas,327
spoke on this issue in 1993.328 She noted that only three percent of
victims of sexual harassment pursue relief through litigation, and she
attributes this to the financial and emotional burdens of pursuing such
claims. She specifically argued that evidence rules that allow discov
ery of a sexual harassment plaintiff's mental health history have a
" chilling effect" on victims' decisions whethe r to pursue litigation.329
326. Robinson, supra note 37, at 77 ("Millions of American workers are effectively thwarted
from exercising their civil rights merely because they have undergone psychotherapy. ").
327. PERLIN, supra note 42, at 22; see also JANE FLAX, T HE AMERICAN DREAM rN BLAcK &
WHITE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS HEARINGS 65 (1998) ("Ostensibly searching for a motive, the
senators speculated extensively about Anita Hill's psychology and relationships with men." ).
328. Thaai Walker, Anita Hills Tells of Stress in Sex Harassment Cases , S.F . CHRON., Aug. 5,
1993, at A7.
329. 1d. See also Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that
" (d]iscovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives . .. has the clear potential to discourage sexual
harassment litigants from prosecuting lawsuits such as the instant one."); Beth S. Frank, Note,
Protecting the Privacy ofSexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and
Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
639, 663 (2001) ("Without the protection of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, individuals
who seek therapy will be reluctant to bring suit or will not bring suit at all for legitimate claims of
harassment out of fear that their mental health will be placed on trial.").
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of California , in an e arly decision ana
lyzing the patient-litigant exce ption, conside red the risk that a broad
reading of the exce ption " might effectively deter many psychothera
peutic patients fr om instituting any general claim for me ntal suffering
and damage out of fear of opening up all past communications to dis
covery."330 Such " result would clearly be an intolerable and over
broad intrusion into the patient 's privacy, not sufficie ntly limited to
the legitimate state interes t embodied in the provision and would cre
ate oppo rtunities for harassme nt and blackmail. "331 Accordingly, the
court construed the exception as a " limited waiver concomitant with
the purposes of the exception."332
More recently, the EEOC noted the importance of a court's con
struction of waiver of the psychothe rapist-patient privilege to the
agency's ability to bring actions t o re medy incidents of discrimination.
When , in a class action race discrimination case, a magistrate judge
de nied a defendant 's motion to compel discovery of, among othe r
things, the plaintiffs ' mental he alth histories and records, the agency's
regional attorney praised the ruling as " one of those genuinely impor
tant court decisions which, u nfortunately, sometimes disappear with
out ever making it ont o the radar screen."333 The attorney noted that
the magistrate judge " forcefull y rejected the employer's attempt to
use discovery to put the lives of victims of employme nt discrimination
under the microscope " and tha t it was "good to win this one and to
see civil rights litigants protected fr om having their lives turned up
side-down and unnecessarily subjected to the proverbial ' third
degree.' "334
Before the Jaffee opinion , one commentator noted that compelled
me ntal examinations unde r Rule 35
330. In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 570 (Cal. 1970) .
331. Jd.
332. I d. (holding that t he communications subject to disclosure must be " directly relevant" to
the specific conditions alleged by the plaintiff in seeking damages for personal injuries, and not
for "other aspects of t he patient-litigant's personality, even though t hey may in some sense, be
'relevant' to t he substantive issues of litigation.").
333. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Federal Court Sharply Limits
E mployer's A ttempt to Probe Job Bias Victims ' Medical, Arrest and Litigation Histories (Nov.
29, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ press/11 -29-07.htrnl (hereinafter EEOC Press Re 
lease] (quoting John Hendrickson). The court ha d adopted a somewhat narrow view of the
waiver and held that merely asserting claims for emotional distress did not in itself effectu ate a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege provided that the plaintiffs limited their claims to
" negative emotions .. . experienced as the intrinsic result of the defendant's alleged conduct. "
EEOC v. Area E rectors, Inc., 247 F.R.D . 549, 552 (N. D. Ill. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
334. EEOC Press Release, supra note 333.
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may best serve defendants not by illumin ating facts at issue in a
case, but by intimidating potential sexual harassment plaintiffs into
silence. The scope of such examinations can be dauntingly broad
and invasive, permitting inquiry into the plai ntiff's entire psycholog
ical and sexual history. The specter of this invasive inquiry may dis
courage victi ms fro m bringing valid claims.335

Given that many consider disclosure of psychotherapy notes to be
even more invasive, one can assume that such disclosure serves as a
more significa nt deterrent tha n does the possibility of a psychological
examination.
Moreover, where plaintiffs are not dissuaded altogether from bring
ing claims , they may attempt to avoid triggering a finding of implied
waiver by narrowing their claims. In light of the case law reviewed
above, astute plaintiffs ' attorneys will e ngage in careful complaint
drafting or make subsequent amendme nts to pleadings where they
seek to preserve their clients' privilege.336 For exa mple , in Santelli v.
Electro-Motive, the plaintiff avoided waiver only by restricting her
damages claim to " nega tive emotions" such as " humiliation, embar
rassment, and other similar e motions ... as the intrinsic result of the
defendant's alleged conduct."337 She was barred from presenting any
evide nce of "symptoms or conditions that she suffered (e.g. sleepless
ness , nervousness, depression)." 338 As a direct result of these self-im
posed limitations, her communications with her psychotherapist were
" no longer relevant" and for that reason there would be no waiver of
the privilege.339 Similarly, in Koch v. Cox , the appellate court noted
that the plaintiff's complaint made no reference to e motional distress
damages, eliminating one of the defendant's bases for seeking psycho
therapy records. 340 Although courts generally deny access to the
records as a result of such strategic pleading, the final result is of
course a victory for the defendants since they succeed in avoiding any
exposure to liability for e motional distress damages. 341
335. Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272.
336. See, e.g. , In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing the trial court's finding of
waiver in part because the plaintiff had withdrawn his emotional distress claim); Doe v. Mercer
Island Sch. Dist., No. 400, No. Ol6-395JLR, 2006 WL 3361777, at *1 (W.O. Wash. Nov. 20, 2006)
(noting that the plaintiff dropped his emotional damages claim).
337. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D . 306, 309 (N.D. IU. 1999).
338. Jd.
339. /d. ; see also Krocka v. City of Chi., 193 F.R.D. 542, 544 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (imposing limita
tions similar to those in Sante/It).
340. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
341. See Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309 (noting that the plaintiffs success in avoiding waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was " a meager victory,» because the limitations on the evi
dence she could offer " may prevent her from fully recovering for her alleged emotional dis
tress"); see also Covell v. CNG lransmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202, 206 (M. D . Pa. 1994) (pre
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Some courts require plaintiffs to take steps to clarify or curtail their
claims as a condition for enforcement of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. For example, in the recent case of Duck v. Port Jefferson
School District, the magistrate judge ruled that he would deny the de
fendants ' motion to compel disclosure of the plaintiffs mental health
records with respect to those records unrelated to the facts of the case,
provided that [the plai ntiff] file a statement th at she is seeking only
"garden variety" emotional distress claims, that she does not have
" any permanent emotional distress or damage" from the underlying
events, wiU not call a mental health expert witness at trial, and has
not suffered any physical injuries as a result of the defendants ' al 
leged conduct. 342

The Santelli court noted: " Parties ... know for certain that if they
want to maintain the [psychotherapist-pa tient] privilege, they cannot
seek emotional distress damages." 343 The question is whether that
kind of certainty is an acceptable consequence of courts' approach to
implied waiver. A psychologist has hypothesized that women likely
scale back their sexual harassment claims for emotional damages and
choose not to offer testimony of an expert witness to avoid findings
that they have waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which
would open up their entire mental health history. 344 H owever, such
stra tegic decisions will result in juries hearing no expert testimony on
the psychological impact of sexual harassment, potentially undermin
ing plaintiffs' arguments on both liability and damages. 345 These con
fined claims also undermine one of the stated goals of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which was enacted after Congress had determined that
" additional remedies under Fede ral law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and inte ntional discrimination in the workplace."346
Jaffee case recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege in which the plaintiff withdrew her
claims for " pain, suffering, etc. " during litigation apparently after defendants sought her psycho
therapy records).
342. Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV0?-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E .D.N.Y. Jan.
25, 2008) (ordering the plaintiff to produce all " records relevant to the emotional distress that
she claims in this action"); see also EEOC v. Area Erectors, Inc., 247 F .R.D. 549 (N.D. Ill. 2007);
Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 227 (D .N.J. 2000).
343. Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309.
344. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 109; see also McDonald & Kulick, supra note 29, at
xxxvii (observing that plaintiffs have responded to defendants' broad access to mental health
records by curtailing their own use of mental health experts in litigation, eliminating one of
defendants' arguments in support of an order compelling disclosure of a plaintiffs mental health
history) .
345. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 110.
346. Pub. L. No . 102-166, § 2(1) , 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U .S.C. § 1981) . One of the
stated purposes of the statute was "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimina
tion and unlawful harassment in the workplace. " !d. § 3(1).
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For ADA cases in particular, the result could be especially ironic.
The construction of waiver should be more, not less , narrow where the
jury is not being aske d to quantify emotional injury or to determine its
cause but only to make a threshold finding of whether someone is
disabled. The purpose of the ADA would be undermined as well if
one subset of people with disabilities- those with mental illness
found that their valued legal right to prevent disclosure of mental
health treatment records had been quickly discarded solely because
they tried to vindicate their right to be free from discrimination based
on having the conditions for which they received such treatment.347
As the federal courts emphasize repeatedly, privileges are regarded
with disfavor in the courts. However, once we have determined that a
set of communications is among those warranting the protection of a
privilege, that protection must be meaningful. Courts and defendants
are unrealistic in their demand for cost-free privileges. There is no
question that there is a cost imposed by maintaining the secrecy of a
certain kind of relevant evidence, but finding waiver and compelling
disclosure of psychotherapy records are not cost-free alternatives.
Such actions broadly discourage people with a history of mental
health treatment from seeking the full range of remedies available
through federal litigation for deprivation of their rights under the
Constitution or the civil rights laws e nacted by Congress. Indeed, one
district court explicitly adopting the narrow approach to waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege reasoned that " for policy reasons, a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be narrowly
construed, particularly in civil rights cases where Congress has placed
much importance on litigants' access to the courts and the remedial
nature of such suits."348 As Justice Goldberg noted in Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, a court cannot conclude that " a plaintiff has waived a right by
exercising his right of access to the federal courts."349
B.

An Alternative Approach to Waiver

In order to serve a rights-vindicating instrumental rationale, and to
limit the other costs of an uncertain privilege- most notably the bur
den on courts and litigants to litigate the issue of waiver repeatedly
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one purpose of the ADA is "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individ
uals with disabilities."). Cf Smith, supra note 323, at 71-72 (arguing that requiring ADA plain
tiffs to provide medical proof of their disability serves to disempower people with disabilities by,
among other things, compelling them to disclose detailed information regarding their disabilities
and suggesting that the requirement may deter people from pursuing ADA claims).
348. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
349. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964).
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most fe deral courts will need to change course entirely in their ap
proach to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.350 The fol
lowing proposed approach addresses the most common scenarios in
which these questions arise; namely, during discovery of psychother
apy records, when a plaintiff has sought a motion for a protective or
der, a plaintiff or psychothe rapist files a motion to quash a subpoena,
or a defenda nt files a motion to compel responses to discovery
requests.
When a plaintiff resists a defendant's request for current or past
mental health records , the first step in the analysis should be an initial
determination, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure , of
whether such records are in fact within the scope of permissible dis
covery. As noted above, courts generally fail to consider tha t, even if
a party has apparently waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
Rule 26 nonetheless permits discovery only of information reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and fur
nishes a basis to shie ld certain informa tion from discovery based upon
considerations of privacy, embarrassment, oppression, and burden.351
At the outset, therefore, the court should consider whether all or any
of the information sought by the defendant is "releva nt to the claim or
defense of any party. "352 As discussed above, while this is a broad
standa rd, courts should not fail to consider- and should require de
fendants to demonstrate-that the information sought is in fact rele
vant.353 At this stage, the court can conside r the time frame of the
records sought and the relation to the plaintiff's claims and facts al
leged in the action. 354 For example, a court may conclude that the
documents sought are too distant in time from the events at issue in
the litigation or that the records are simply unrelated to any of the
issues in dispute.3ss
350. At least one pair of commentators has suggested that states have taken a more accepting
view of the privilege and a far narrower view of waiver. Kent & Kent, supra note 195, at 480
(noting that Michigan was one of the few states in which a claim for emotional distress alone was
considered to have effectuated a waiver of the physician-patient privilege).
351. FED. R. C 1v. P. 26(c).
352. FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b) (1).
353. Id.
354. An example of a court giving a narrow view of the scope of discovery where psychother
apy records are in issue is Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc. , 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md.
1997) . The court noted that even where a patient has put her "mental condition at issue" she
" has a right to have discovery limited to information that is directly relevant to the lawsuit" and
therefore the scope of the inquiry would be limited to the extent to which the defendant's con
duct caused her alleged harm. Id. at 709.
355. See generally 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 244, § 2009, at 124 (" A specific request for
discovery is measured by the court against the background of a specific case. What may be
relevant, and subject to discovery, in one case of a certain type may be irrelevant in another
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Specifically, there is little basis to require disclosure of me ntal
he alth records that predate the incident at question in a particular
case, unless such records served as the basis for a testifying expert's
opinion, as discussed below. Courts should carefully evaluate a defen
dant's " alternative sources of e motional distress" argument to deter
mine if such evide nce could in fact be used properly to avoid liability
or to argue for reduced damages under theories of causation and ap
portionment. A preexisting me ntal he alth condition does not entitle a
defendant access to a plaintiff's entire mental health history to fish for
past stressors, trauma, diagnoses, personality disorders, or other facts
that could be used to discredit the plaintiff. A defendant must make a
specific showing of the relevancy of such past records to a claim o r
defense asserted by the parties, even if the current treating psycho
therapist created the records.356 Thus, considerations of relevancy are
appropriate in the overall analysis of a dispute regarding the discovery
of mental health records, but only with respect to the scope of discov
ery, not to whether there has been a waiver of the psychotherapist
patient privilege.
Rule 26 provides other limita tions on discovery as well. A court
may, "for good cause," issue an order "to protect a party or person
from annoyance, emba rrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex
pense. "357 A litigant's privacy interes ts may be considered as part of
this analysis.358 Prior to Jaffee, when the existence of a privilege was
far more in doubt and Rule 26 served as plaintiffs' primary means of
avoiding disclosure of psychotherapy records, courts were much more
willing to consider Rule 26 arguments to limit the scope of discovery
of such records.359 Since Jaffee, however, the discussion focuses al
most e ntirely on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege with
little discussion of the outer limits of the scope of discovery. H owseemingly-similar case. "). See, e.g. , Scaife v. Boenne, 191 F.R.D. 590, 592 (N .D. Ind. 2000) (de
nying discovery requests on basis of relevance); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 1406,
1408 (D.N.M. 1997) (limiting the scope of party's discovery request on the basis of relevance).
356. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1997). Assuming that the
court also finds a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it should consider conducting
an in camera review of the records to determine whether they meet the Rule 26 definition of
relevance. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D . 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
357. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(1).
358. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 4{,7 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984); see also Kunstler v. City of
New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *11- 12 (S.D.N .Y. 2006) (concluding that, even
in the absence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, Rule 26 gives the court discretion to limit
defendant's access to "what is plainly very sensitive information").
359. See, e.g. , Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'J., 163 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D . Utah 1995) (holding that
defendant's access to plaintiffs psychotherapy records in sexual harassment action would be
limited to those reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, which would be deter
mined by the court after an in camera review) .
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ever, there is no reason to disrega rd notions of privacy in making ini
tial determinations of whether the information sought is properly the
subject of discovery.360
If the records fall within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, the
next matter to consider is whether they are covered by the psycho
therapist-patient privilege, and specifically whether the discovery
sought consists of "confidential communications between a psycho
therapist and her patient."361 This is a determination made without
reference to fairness or necessity and considers only whether the
records reflect communications made "in the course of diagnosis or
treatment" by a "licensed psychotherapist. "362 If the privilege does
not apply, then the plaintiff may be ordered to produce the informa
tion sought.
Assuming, however, tha t these two questions are answered in the
affirmative- that the information sought falls within the scope of dis
covery and also is covered by the psychotherapist-patie nt privilege
the court should next conside r a defendant's arguments that the psy
chotherapist-patient privilege has been waived through some action of
the plaintiff. Many courts impose on the plaintiff the burden of dis
proving waiver. 363 This approach is misplaced. Courts uniformly view
the burden of proving the existence of the privilege (i.e. that there was
a psychotherapist-pa tient rela tionship and that the communications
were confidential) as being properly imposed on the party asserting
the privilege.364 However, a waiver, or lack thereof, is not an "essen
tial element" of the privilege itself. Rather, it occurs only through
affirmative conduct of the person asserting privilege after the commu
nication has occurred and has the effect of vitiating the waiver. 365
360. For example, records detailing communications concerning sexual dysfunction might be
the subject of a protective order where such dysfunction is not an issue in the litigation.
361. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) . See United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044,
104&--49 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1638 (2006); United States v. Schwensow, 151
F.3d 650, 657- 58 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that communications with alcoholics anonymous tele
phone volunteers do not fall within the privilege).
362. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 15.
363. See, e.g. , Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL
2711534, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006); James v. Harris County, 237 F.R.D. 606, 609 (S.D. Tex.
2006); Merrill v. Waffle House Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Fitzgerald v. Cassil,
216 F.R.D. 632, 636 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105,
1108 (C D. Cal. 2000).
364. See IMWJNKELRJED, supra note 46, § 6.3.1, at 524-25 (" It is well-settled that the person
claiming the privilege has the ultimate burden of proof under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
on all . . . elements." ) .
365. Federal courts are generally divided on the issue of which party bears the burden of
proof on the issue of waiver of a privilege. Jd. § 6.12.2, at ~. Some courts assume that the
burden should be borne by the party with the better access to information and evidence about
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Thus, the burden of showing waiver should fall on the party asserting
that such subsequent action has occurred, rather than requiring the
privilege holder to prove a negative.366
In orde r to determine whether the pa rty asserting that there was a
waiver has met its burde n, the court should focus solely on the actions
of the privilege holde r, generally the plaintiff. The inquiry is whether
the plaintiff volunta rily took steps t hat can be properly viewed as ef
fectuating a waiver of the psychotherapist-pa tient privilege.367 The
easiest cases in which to find a waiver are those where the plaintiff has
specifically authorized disclosure of t he communications , or where the
plaintiff indicates an intention to use the privileged communications
as evide nce to support her claim, such as to demonstrate damages or
the fact of a disability. She may do so by designating a psychothera
pist as an expert witness , producing mental health records through au
tomatic disclosure or otherwise in t he discovery process,368 signing
release forms, or turning the records over to third parties who are not
covered by that o r another privilege.369
If the defendant argues t hat a waiver is implied by other conduct,
courts should consider whether a plaintiff has truly attempted to use
" the privilege as a sword instead of a shield."370 Where the plaintiff
seeks no claim to recover for payment of mental health treatment re
lated to the accident and lists no mental health provider as a witness ,
there can generally be no finding that t he plaintiff has made an " ofthe circumstances of a waiver, which would be the holder of the privilege. !d. § 6.12.2, at 845.
Other courts have set forth a burden-shifting analysis under which after the privilege holder has
demonstrated the existence of the privilege itself, a burden of " going forward " shifts to the other
party which must produce evidence upon which a fact finder could find that the privilege has
been waived. See, e.g. , Carmona v. State, 947 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) .
366. See Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1999) ("The party seeking to overcome
the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege has been waived.").
367. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir . 2008) (concluding that there was no waiver
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by the plaintiff where " nothing in the record [ J suggests
that [the plaintiff] made a knowing election to waive" the privilege).
368. See generally FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (describing categories of information and docu
ments that must be provided even in the absence of a specific discovery request); FED. R. Ctv. P .
26(a)(2) (information to be disclosed regarding any potential trial witness who may offer expert
opinion testimony); FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (interrogatories to be answered under oath); FED. R. Ctv.
P. 34 (request for production of documents).
369. Providing records to her attorney would not limit a plaintiffs ability to later claim privi
lege since communications with her attorney are themselves covered by a privilege. lM
wrNKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60.
370. Johnson , 977 P.2d at 157; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and
the Li1igalor, 84 MrcH. L. REv. 1605, 1607 (1986) ("[T]he principle concern is selective use of
privileged materials to garble the truth, which mandates giving the opponent access to related
privileged material to set the record straight.") (referring to the attorney-client privilege).
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fe nsive use of t he privilege" upon which a court could infer waiver.371
And where an act effectuating waiver is fou nd, it should operate as an
implied waiver only as to confidential communications connected to
such waiver.
Thus, even where a plaintiff lists a mental health professional as an
expert witness, the scope of t he privilege waiver reaches o nly those
communications upon which the expert bases her opinion.372 In the
case of a trea ting psychotherapist offering an opinion, this would nec
essarily include communications between t he plaintiff and t he psycho
t herapist. Similarly, if the t reating or consulting t herapist reviewed
notes and records from other t reatment and relied upon t hose in
reaching t he expert opinions to be offered at trial, such records would
also be subject to discovery. H owever, if t he psychotherapist has not
relied upon the t reatment records of other psychotherapists , t hen
t here is no basis to use waiver as a rationale for requiring disclo
sure.373 A defend ant may ask the plaintiff whether she has sought any
o ther mental health t reatment, and an expert's failure to review o r
consider other diagnos tic impressions and t reatment records is cer
tainly fair fodde r fo r cross-examina tion, but it does not warrant a
court order compelling plaintiff to produce t he content of such other
t reatment records.374
A court cannot assume that any claim fo r emotional harm or mental
disability will necessarily involve expert testimony. Unquestionably, a
plaintiff can present emotional distress testimony without expert testi
mony375 or offer her own testimony in support of claim of mental disa
371. Johnson , 977 P.2d at 157.
372. A party is entitled to discovery of " the data or other information considered by the [op
posing party's designated expert] witness in forming [her] opinions." FED. R. C.v. P .
26(a)(2) (B) .
373. If a party withholds psychotherapy records from the expert witness, such records would
not be subject to discovery under either Rule 26 or as a result of waiver of the psychotherapist
patient privilege. The court in Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999), while
finding no waiver, rejected the " narrow waiver rule," because it would " enable a party who had
undergone psychotherapy to offer at trial only the testimony of a retained, non -treating expert
and thereby prevent discovery of what she had told her treating psychotherapist." /d. at 308.
This ability to present only a "selective 'history'" of one's mental health treatment would
" thwart the truth seeking process by using the privilege as both a shield and a sword. " /d. While
the court may not approve of the result of the recognition of the privilege in Jaffee, the basic
principles underlying privileges and waivers would indeed result in restricted access to poten
tially relevant information. See supra notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
374. In addition, the opposing party may take the deposition of an expert designated by the
plaintiff. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(b)(4) ("A party may depose any person who has been identified as
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.").
375. DoBBs, supra note 24, at 832 ("[M]edical testimony is not ordinarily required to demon
strate either the severity of [severe emotional distress] or its cause."). See also Lewis R. Hagood,
Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM . L.
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bility;J76 she may therefore choose to fo rego calling a treating or
evaluating psychotherapist.377 Jurors can infer emotional distress
from t he fact of discrimination alone. A plaintiffs decision not to des
igna te her treating psychotherapist may ultimately make it more diffi
cult for her to convince a jury as to the degree of her e motional
distress , or the fact t hat she is disabled, but that is her choice to
ma ke.378 Defense attorneys can use cross-examina tion, testimony of
other witnesses, and argument to attack to the sufficiency of the plain
tiffs claim .379 The key is to put the control of the issue in the hands of
the party with the burden of proof as part of the strategy for the pros
ecution of her case.
A defendant may de monstrate implied waiver of certain records by
pointing to a plaintiff's claim for recovery of the cost of treatment, but
such waiver will only extend to communications directly relating to
such costs. Courts should not be too quick to conclude that a plaintiff
seeks such compensation based upon the typical, broad language
found in the civil complaint's damages clause.380 A better approach is
to require defendants to show that a plaintiff has made such claims
through statements included in Rule 26(a)(l) " Initial Disclosures,"381
or through answers to interroga tories or deposition testimony contain
ing explanations from plaintiffs of the na ture of the claims they will be
REv. 577, 582 (1999) (noting that federal courts generally do not require plaintiffs to offer expert
testimony in support of claim for emotional or psychological damages); Walker v. Mac Frugals
Bargains, Closeouts, Inc., No. Civ. A . 93-4135, 1994 WL 693387, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1994)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment and noting that "while it will ultimately be
plaintiff's burden to prove that the harassment proximately caused her alleged [emotional] inju
ries, she can do so without expert medical testimony.") .
376. See generally Smith, supra note 323 (arguing that courts may not require ADA plaintiffs
to offer expert medical evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability).
377. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996). See also
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[E]xpert testimony is not essential to litigate the
validity of [emotional distress] damages claims. "); Enforcement Guidance, supra note 260, 'I
6226.
378. See Hagood, supra note 375, at 583-85, 589. An absence of expert testimony in support
of claims may also make any award more vulnerable to attack on appeal. /d.
379. H ucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (" (l]t may be that the
plaintiff- without the benefit of medical testimony- will be compromised in his efforts to per
suade the jury that he has emotional distress that was caused by the defendants, and that is not
instead the product of his preexisting condition. However, that will be for the jury to decide at a
later time. "); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 (noting that although privi
leged information may be " logically relevant" to a plaintiffs claims, defense counsel has "alter
native means" either to " attack the weight of the plaintiffs damages evidence or to suggest an
alternative cause").
380. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a)(3).
381. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(a)(1). For example, plaintiffs must provide the opposing party " a
computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party" at the outset of the
discovery period. FED. R. C.v. P. 26(a)(l)(C).
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pursuing. A court may find waiver only where, through such sta te
ments, the plaintiff has indicated that she intends to include such spe
cific amounts in her da mage claims.
But even where a waiver is found, however, a court must nonethe
less take steps to limit disclosure and ensure tha t there is a direct link
between the plaintiff's actions leading to waiver and the records for
which the privilege has been waived- the actual confide ntial commu
nications she intends to use to support her claim. Thus, if a plaintiff
includes a claim for recovery of the costs of certain mental health
treatment, the waiver only extends to certain records regarding such
treatment. For example, the billing, trea tment plan, diagnostic im
pression, and similar documents may demonstrate that the costs were
incurred fo r the alleged injury. Courts should not compel disclosure
of trea tment notes and psychological exa minations, which are likely
the most sensitive records, if the implied waiver is based sole ly upon
seeking payment fo r psychotherapy.3s2
A court may not conclude t hat the plaintiff has waived t he psycho
therapist-patie nt privilege based solely upon a plaintiff's claim fo r
emotional distress damages , a separate claim for negligent o r inten
tional infliction of emotional distress, or an allegation t hat she is dis
abled on the basis of a mental illness. In many, if not most, cases in
which a plaintiff puts forth such claims and allegations, she will desig
na te her psychotherapist or a consulting mental health professional as
a testifying expert witness to support the claims. Because such expert
testimony is not required , however, a plaintiff who has sought trea t
ment, perhaps for the emotional distress caused by the defendant's
misconduct and perhaps at another time in her life, may choose not to
offer the testimony of a past or current psychotherapist.
Thus, absent use of such confidential communications in support of
her claim, a court should not conclude that a plaintiff has waived the
psychotherapist-patie nt privilege with respect to those communica
tions. Unquestionably, such psychotherapis ts may have relevant and
revealing evidence to offer the fac t fi nder, and such a reading of
waiver would keep the evide nce from the fact finder.383 But basing a
382. A plaintiff would likely offer in evidence some record of payment for treatment in sup
port of such claim.
383. See Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, *11- 12 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) . The court explained:
In rejecting the at-issue argument pressed by defendants, we note that, in substance, it
rests on the notion that access to treatment records might, in some not-too-specifically
defined way, be helpful to defendants in preparing to rebut plaintiffs' damage case. To
accept this notion as the touchstone of waiver would be inconsistent with the far more
demanding standards generally recognized for at-issue waiver of other privileges, and
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finding of waiver upon mere allegations of emotional harm is inconsis
tent with underlying principles of absolute privileges and waiver in
American law. 384 As Professor Imwinkelried has noted with respect
to waiver of testimonial privileges, the fundamental issue should be
whether a litigant " introduces trial testimony that expressly or implic
itly discloses substance of the protected communications."385
Even where a court finds a waiver, the court should take additional
measures to protect litigants and to follow the broader aims of discov
ery and litiga tion. Rule 26 not only provides tha t certain information
is entirely outside the scope of discovery, as discussed above, but it
also authorizes trial judges to exercise their discretion to ensure that
discovery is pursued fairly and appropriately.386 For example , courts
should consider limitations on the disclosure of the plaintiff's confi
dential statements made during the course of litiga tion to enable the
would be particularly inappropriate in view of the very strong emphasis of the Supreme
Court on the notion that this particular privilege is not a conditional one, that is, not
one that can be set aside on the basis of a party's showing of need. If need alone does
not justify waiver, still Jess can a speculative definition of conceivable relevance be
sufficient to justify eviscerating this privilege.
Jd. Further, enforcement of the privilege does not necessarily require exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence pertaining to a plaintiff's mental health and other potential causes of emo
tional distress. Defense counsel remains free to inquire regarding these areas- with some limi
tations, such as those set forth under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and Civil Procedure Rule 26,
more generally- in depositions and on cross-examination. Bernabei & Schroader, supra note 5,
at 33. Defense counsel may depose or call at trial other witnesses to testify regarding a plain
tiffs emotional health. Fasman, supra note 37, at 537. A plaintiff may find that she has painted
herself into a corner by not offering testimony or records from her treating psychotherapist.
384. See supra notes 133- 155 and accompanying text. Further, because the state of the Jaw of
waiver based solely upon claims for emotional distress is so unsettled, arguably, one cannot
knowingly waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by including a claim for emotional distress
in her prayer for relief on a complaint. In effect, courts fail to offer proper disclosure when they
find implied waiver given the current state of the Jaw. See Berg, supra note 135, at 322-23.
385. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 885 (emphasis added) .
386. FED. R. CJv. P. 26. Rule 26(c), " Protective Orders," provides the following, nonexclusive
list of measures that a trial court may take " to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" :
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or dis
covery to certain matters;
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com
mercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.
I d.
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plaintiff to continue such treatment without concern tha t her state
ments will be subjected to scrutiny.387 Thus, if treatment is ongoing,
any records created after the request for discovery should remain con
fidential and there should be no continuing disclosure requirement or
subsequent request for records absent a specific showing for good
cause.388 Similarly, any and all references to the litigation itsel£,389 re
gardless of when created, may be redacted. Disclosure certainly
would chill the sessions once a plaintiff knows that all records will be
subject to a continuing disclosure requirement.
Courts should also limit review of any mental health information
obtained in discovery, including deposition testimony, to the parties'
attorneys, absent a special showing of need, and courts should further
require that attorneys not offer the informa tion in support of a motion
for summary judgment or at trial without the court 's prior authoriza
tion.390 To the extent that such records are filed in support of a mo
tion, the court should seal and redact the filings to limit access to such
information through users of PACER-the federal courts' on-line case
filing system- or online legal research services. All of these require
ments should be contained in a standard Protective Orde r issued upon
the request of a party in a civil case in which mental health records
may be sought or produced. Further, because a Rule 35 exam would
be fa r less intrusive in many insta nces, courts can give plaintiffs who
seek damages for ongoing and future psychiatric injury the option of
387. For example, courts should afford plaintiffs some level of protection against discovery of
statements such as those admitted at trial in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815,
820 (6th Cir. 2007), discussed supra at note 41. The marginal probative value of such statements
to the central issues in dispute is slight compared with the potential injury to both a psychother
apy-patient relationship and the attorney-client relationship.
388. See FED. R. Gv. P. 26(e) (requiring supplementation of prior discovery responses under
certain circumstances); VasconceUos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 708 (D. Md. 1997)
(granting motion to quash subpoena of records of treating psychotherapist based upon " serious
concerns that the disclosures will adversely affect [the plaintiffs) psychiatric treatment").
389. Plaintiffs may discuss or refer to-expressly or impliedly- any otherwise privileged com
munications in the context of communications with their attorneys. Since they are only disclos
ing the communications in the context of another privileged communication, there is no waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. IMWINKELRTED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60. Accordingly,
in order to provide an additional level of protection against possible disclosure of such communi
cations, or, more generally, the mental impressions and strategies of the plaintiff and her attor
ney, courts should guard against disclosure of such discussions.
390. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering magistrate
to conduct initial in camera review of psychotherapy records to determine " if, and to what ex
tent , the evidence is relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim for emotional distress" and upon the re
lease of the records to "place an appropriate protective order on the materials to preserve the
confidentiality of the medical information "); see also In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 572 (Cal.
1970) (suggesting that a protective order may be appropriate where psychotherapy records are
disclosed) .

2008]

PS Y CHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

149

submitting to such an exa mination in lieu of producing records of
treatment.391 Finally, courts can tie the production of documents to
the prospect of a triaJ.392
The approach advocated here is not only consistent with principles
of privileges and waiver, but it also provides several important advan
tages to litigants and the courts. While court rules and legal principles
must of course provide flexibility to fit the wide range of scenarios
that may arise in a case, all participants in litigation-and those con
templating or facing possible litiga tion- benefit from some degree of
certainty on the questions that are likely to arise. 393 At this time in
the federal courts , there is little, if any, certainty as to how a judge or
magistrate may approach a dispute over the application and waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil litigation. As a result,
waiver disputes must be litigated repeatedly, with no resolution of the
broader questions raised by these controversies.394

391. See FED. R. Gv. P. 26(c)(1)(C) (authorizing a court to "prescribe(e) a discovery method
other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery"); Vasconcellos, 962 F. Supp. at 709
(granting motion to quash subpoena of psychotherapy records where plaintiff volunteered to
undergo a psychiatric examination).
392. In Dominguez-Silva v. Harvey, No. Civ:3:04-CV-135-JTC, 2006 WL 826091, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 23, 2006), for example, the court concluded that there had been a waiver of the psycho
therapist-patient privilege due to the plaintiff's inclusion of a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but the court ruled that the plaintiff would not be compe11ed to disclose his
mental health records unless and until his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
survived the pending motion for summary judgment since the records were not needed for sum
mary judgment purposes. See also Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 558 (N.D.
Ga. 2001).
393. Since there are conflicts within the same district on this issue, litigants can enjoy some
certainty only if there is a prior decision by the same judge or magistrate. However, given the
number of recent cases in the courts of appeals, which appear to set forth rules but which pro
vide little analysis, see supra notes 183- 186 and accompanying text, there is an increased chance
that some lower courts wi11 feel compe11ed to reverse themselves.
394. While this Article focuses on discovery of mental health records, because that is usually
the juncture at which these issues arise, a court should also consider the impact on the plaintiff
and her psychotherapy to the extent that such information is used as trial evidence. It is one
thing to order disclosure subject to a protective order of such communications. It is quite an
other to permit the admissibility of such communications at trial, which may be attended by the
public and the media. Comprehensive treatment of the issue of admissibility of mental health
records at trial is beyond the scope of this Article, but I would note that courts should be con
scious of the potential misuse of such evidence by jurors and employ Federal Rule of Evidence
403 or other rules of evidence to guard against such misuse. See In re Lifshutz, 467 P.2d 557,
572-73 (Cal 1970) (suggesting that Rule 403 discretion should be exercised with respect to the
compe11ed testimony of a treating psychotherapist "to provide substantial protection for the pa
tient's legitimate interests").
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CoNCLUSION

The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege impli
cates a collision of competing aims. The Supreme Court in Jaffee rec
ognized the importance of mental health treatment, both to the
individual patient and to society.395 The federal statutes underlying
the plaintiffs ' claims in the cases in which waiver issues arise were
broadly designed to discourage and to remedy unlawful discrimination
and deprivations of federally protected rights. At the same time, our
court system's central aim is to facilitate a sea rch for the truth, as re
flected in a litigant's broad right to obtain discovery from other par
ties. As a result of this truth-seeking objective, evidentiary
privileges- legal rights that necessarily inhibit access to the truth- are
regarded with disfavor. However, as one commentator noted more
than twenty years ago with respect to courts' construction of the attor
ney-client privilege: " loss of privilege protection should be justified
by something more than antipathy toward the privilege." 396 This ob
servation equally captures the central problem with the conceptualiza
tion of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal
courts today.
While truth-seeking is unquestionably a central and important ob
ject of federal litigation, it cannot be invoked in ways that undermine
the predominant goal of facilita ting justice. Courts must ensure that
those litigants who have sought mental health treatment are not dis
suaded from seeking vindication of their rights through the federal
courts merely because they fear that their mental health history will
become the focus of discovery and trial.3 97 As one federal magistrate
judge noted: "Treating claims for incidental e motional damages as
waivers of the [psychotherapist-patie nt] privilege unfairly disadvan
tages those litigants who seek mental health counseling services as
compared to otherwise identical litigants who refrain from seeking
professional counseling." 398 Courts must take an approach that fol
lows the precedent set down by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and the
legal traditions regarding both the enforcement and waiver of rights,
while preserving the federal courts as a place where all litigants, re
395. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
396. Marcus, supra note 370, at 1607.
397. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("Amongst those in our populace who,
through no fault of their own, find themselves on the plaintiff side of a tort case, there will
always be a certain proportion who have sought counseling for unrelated personal problems or
who are suffering from unrelated emotional difficulties. ") .
398. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug.
21, 2001).
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gardless of their mental health history, can fairly seek compensation
for injuries.
Indeed, such reform will likely be ineffective unless it originates
with the Supreme Court itself, which has thus far declined to gra nt
certiorari on the question of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patie nt
privilege.399 The Court must set a course for lower courts on this im
portant question. Absent such guidance, the psychotherapist-patie nt
privilege recognized in Jaffee will continue to be "uncertain " and,
therefore, " little better than no privilege at all." 400 Fe deral court
houses will continue to be effectively shut to many potential civil
rights plaintiffs with a history of mental illness.

399. See, e.g., Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 127 S. Ct. 1815 (2007) .
400. Jaffee, 518 U .S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
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